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If there are no arbitrage opportunities then the log-change in the real exchange rate
between two economies (say, the United States and the United Kingdom) can always be
expressed as the log difference between a stochastic discount factor (SDF) denominated in
the real currency units of those economies:
log change in the real
U.S./U.K. exchange rate
=
log SDF in
real pounds
− log SDF in
real dollars
. (1)
The recent international asset pricing literature frequently interprets the right hand side
of Eq. (1) as the difference between the log intertemporal marginal rates of substitution
(IMRSs) of distinct representative agents in the two economies.1 With this interpretation,
the literature argues that the returns on foreign currency investments (including various
carry trade strategies) reflect differences between the log IMRSs of distinct agents in the two
economies. Following Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006), we refer to this economic
interpretation of Eq. (1) as the asset market view of exchange rates. It is now a dominant
theoretical framework in international asset pricing and has been used to gain insights into
exchange rate determination, foreign exchange risk premia, and international risk sharing.2
We offer a critique of the fundamental premise of this literature. Our main point is that
the returns on currency investments, alone, cannot possibly be informative about differences
between the log IMRSs of distinct agents in the two economies (expressed in common units).
The intuition for our main critique is quite simple: all agents face the same relative prices
for any assets and goods that they can frictionlessly trade with each other. Therefore,
1The SDF that is linear in a set of asset returns can be interpreted as the linear projection of an agent’s
IMRS down onto those returns. Thus, if a set of asset returns completely span the agent’s IMRS then the
SDF that is linear in those returns must equal the agent’s IMRS.
2Examples of papers where this approach appears include: Bansal (1997); Backus, Foresi, and Telmer
(2001); Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002); Smith and Wickens (2002); Brandt et al. (2006); Lustig and Verdel-
han (2006); Brennan and Xia (2006); Lustig and Verdelhan (2007); Bakshi, Carr, and Wu (2008); Verdelhan
(2010); Colacito and Croce (2011); Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011); Bansal and Shaliastovich
(2013); and Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2014). For an overview of this approach, see Lustig and
Verdelhan (2012)’s chapter in the recent Handbook of Exchange Rates, entitled “Exchange Rates in a Stochas-
tic Discount Factor Framework.”
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these prices alone can only be informative about the common component of agents’ IMRSs
(measured in the same units), not about differences.
To be clear, we do not question Eq. (1). As we highlighted at the onset, it is guaranteed
to hold if there are no arbitrage opportunities. Instead, we argue that the economic content
in Eq. (1) is much weaker than previous literature suggests. Central to our argument is the
observation that, in general, there are not two economically distinct SDFs on the right hand
side of Eq. (1). Rather, it is the same SDF simply denominated in different units. In Section
2 we show that this change of numeraire units is the analog of denominating a set of asset
returns in real pounds rather than real dollars: the assets are the same, only the units that
are used to denominate the returns on those assets are different. Likewise, in general, there
is a single SDF on the right hand side of Eq. (1), and only the numeraire units differ.
The real U.S./U.K. exchange rate is the ratio of the values of the consumption baskets
of representative agents in the U.S. and the U.K. It is an intratemporal price, not the real
return on a foreign currency investment. One aspect of our critique is that much of the recent
literature on real exchange rates focuses exclusively on asset markets, but is silent about the
specific nature of preferences and frictions in the goods market. Of course, asset markets
are important, but asset prices and the returns on currency investments don’t provide the
whole picture.
Our main critique is quite simple, but it applies very broadly. In Section 2 we examine
the large literature that uses the asset market view as the basis for reduced-form no-arbitrage
models of foreign currency returns. In Section 3 we consider structural models of real ex-
change rates. In Section 4 we discuss inferences that have been made about international
risk sharing and the correlation of agents’ IMRSs. In each case, our main message is that
the economic insights afforded by the asset market view of exchange rates are much weaker
than the previous literature suggests.
Although our paper is primarily critical, we offer several positive takeaways. First,
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reduced-form models of currency returns only need to specify an SDF denominated in a
single numeraire, rather than multiple numeraire units. In Section 2 we show that models
of the same SDF denominated in different units offer no additional insights, but are much
less transparent, and papers that use this modeling approach often inadvertently introduce
additional assumptions or even arbitrage opportunities. Modeling an SDF denominated in a
single numeraire is more straightforward and exploits the same rich modeling toolset that has
been developed in the broader asset pricing literature. Second, Eq. (1), expressed in terms
of IMRSs instead of SDFs, offers a useful empirical diagnostic for any structural model in
which markets are complete, and preferences are specified as functions of observable data.
This diagnostic could be particularly beneficial for future research because it allows specific
assumptions to be quickly ruled out without solving a social planning problem.3 Third, we
suggest that progress in understanding the determination of exchange rates would benefit
from more work on fully specified models.
Roughly 40 years ago, a consensus emerged that exchange rate models should not ignore
the influence of asset markets on exchange rates.4 This insight was the original “asset
market view,” and we agree with it. Our critique, however, says that while the literature
has developed in interesting directions, it has gone too far towards the notion that exchange
rates can be understood only with reference to financial markets.
1 Notation
Throughout the paper we use the following notation. We let P ∗t be the time-t U.K. pound
cost of a basket of goods purchased at U.K. market prices. Empirically, we think of this
basket as the one corresponding to the construction of the U.K. consumer price index (CPI).
When we discuss structural models, we think of it as a unit of the consumption basket of
3This diagnostic is in the spirit of Backus and Smith (1993) and Kollmann (1995).
4See, for example, Dornbusch (1976), Frenkel (1976), Kouri (1976), and Mussa (1976).
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a representative British agent who we refer to as Bob. We let P˜t be the time-t U.S. dollar
cost of a basket of goods purchased at U.S. market prices. Empirically, this basket is the
one used to construct the U.S. CPI. In structural models, it is the consumption basket of a
representative American agent who we refer to as Amy. In general, we drop the distinction
between the empirical and model concepts by referring to the basket purchased at U.K. prices
as Bob’s basket, and the one purchased at U.S. prices as Amy’s basket.
We let St be the time-t U.S. dollar per U.K. pound nominal exchange rate. Finally,
because it is useful to compare the costs of the two baskets measured in common currency
units, we let Pt ≡ P ∗t St denote the U.S. dollar cost of Bob’s basket (still purchased at
U.K. market prices).5 Our definition of the real U.S./U.K. exchange rate, e, is standard and
compares the cost of Bob’s and Amy’s baskets when measured in common currency units:
et ≡ Pt/P˜t ≡ P ∗t St/P˜t . (2)
The change in the real exchange rate is defined as Xt ≡ et/et−1.
2 Reduced-Form Models
In this section we consider the large literature that uses reduced-form models of two (or
more) SDFs to characterize and interpret changes in the exchange rates via Eq. (1).6 To
analyze this framework, in Section 2.1 we begin by developing formal notation for asset
returns and SDFs.
5Although our notation is somewhat unusual, it helps us maintain consistency throughout the paper.
We use a superscript asterisk (∗) to distinguish between numeraires. So the cost of Bob’s basket in two
different numeraires is either Pt (U.S. dollars) or P
∗
t (U.K. pounds). We use a tilde (˜ ) to distinguish between
(potentially) economically distinct objects measured in a common numeraire. So the cost of Bob’s basket is
Pt and the cost of Amy’s basket is P˜t, when both are measured in U.S. dollars.
6Examples of papers that pursue this modeling approach include: Bansal (1997); Backus et al. (2001);
Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002); Brennan and Xia (2006); Brandt et al. (2006); Bakshi et al. (2008); Lustig
et al. (2011); and Lustig et al. (2014).
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Papers in this literature typically assume that there are two distinct SDFs in Eq. (1).
However, in Section 2.2 we show that Eq. (1) actually characterizes the change of numeraire
units for any single SDF. In other words, the two SDFs in Eq. (1) are actually the same SDF
simply denominated in different units. In Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 we use two examples to
explicitly demonstrate that the change of numeraire for an SDF in a reduced-form model is
always the flip side of the change of numeraire for the asset returns that it prices.
Many international asset pricing papers interpret an SDF denominated in a country’s
(real or nominal) currency as the IMRS (or discounted marginal utility growth) of a rep-
resentative agent in that country or, more generally, as the projection of a representative
agent’s IMRS down onto the asset returns. With this interpretation, when Eq. (1) holds,
changes in the exchange rate appear to offer insights into the difference between the IMRSs
of agents in the two countries. In Section 2.3 we show that this logic is fundamentally
flawed. In Section 2.3.1 we show that Eq. (1) does not hold for the minimum variance (i.e.,
linear) SDFs denominated in each currency. This result directly contradicts previous claims
in many papers, including Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006), Brennan and Xia
(2006), Lustig and Verdelhan (2006), Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2007), and Lustig and
Verdelhan (2012). In Section 2.3.2 we discuss the implications of this result for the inter-
national asset pricing literature. In particular, we make the point that, in any equilibrium,
agents must agree on the prices of goods and assets that they can frictionlessly trade with
each other. Therefore, alone, these prices can only be informative about the common com-
ponent of agents’ IMRSs (measured in the same units), not about differences. Relatedly, in
Section 2.3.3 we show that this argument always applies, regardless of whether there is a
unique SDF in a particular reduced-form model.
Finally, in Section 2.4 we discuss a few well-known examples of papers that claim that
Eq. (1) imposes important restrictions. In Section 2.4.1 we show that Eq. (1) does not hold
for SDFs that price distinct sets of assets denominated in different currencies. In Section
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2.4.2 we show that Eq. (1) does not impose distinct restrictions on an exponential affine
SDF denominated in different units. In Section 2.4.3 we show that the restrictions derived
in the well-known paper by Backus et al. (2001) are not in fact due to Eq. (1), but instead
reflect their implicit assumption that the returns on currencies are completely spanned by
the returns on long-term bonds. We also show that Brandt and Santa-Clara’s model of two
distinct SDFs that don’t satisfy Eq. (1) is not arbitrage-free because it assigns different prices
to the same zero-coupon bond.
2.1 Notation
To begin, we fix notation.
2.1.1 Asset Returns. Consider a set of k assets that can be located anywhere in the
world, and assume that there are no arbitrage opportunities within these assets. Let Rt
denote the vector of cum-dividend returns on these assets from time t− 1 to t, denominated
in units of Amy’s consumption basket (i.e., real U.S. dollars). Then Rt/Xt are these are
asset returns denominated in units of Bob’s consumption basket (i.e., real U.K. pounds).
2.1.2 Stochastic Discount Factors. An SDF for these asset returns, Rt, denominated
in real dollars is any strictly positive (scalar) random variable, Mt > 0, such that
1 = E [MtRt | Ft−1] , (3a)
where Ft−1 is the information filtration available at time t− 1 and 1 denotes a vector of 1’s.
If we instead use real pounds as the numeraire, then an SDF for these asset returns, Rt/Xt,
is any strictly positive (scalar) random variable, MtXt > 0, such that
1 = E [MtXtRt/Xt | Ft−1] . (3b)
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2.2 Change of Numeraire Units for an SDF
Eqs. (3a) and (3b) are identical, since
MtXtRt/Xt = MtRt . (4)
That is, Mt is an SDF for the these asset returns denominated in real dollars, Rt, if and
only if MtXt is that same SDF for the same asset returns, Rt/Xt, denominated instead in
real pounds. Put differently, Rt → Rt/Xt characterizes the change of units mapping from
real dollars to real pounds for a set of asset returns, if and only if Mt →MtXt characterizes
the corresponding change of units mapping for any SDF that prices those asset returns.
We can always write this change of numeraire units in words as
log SDF for asset
returns in real
U.K. pounds︸ ︷︷ ︸
lnMtXt
=
log SDF for asset
returns in real
U.S. dollars︸ ︷︷ ︸
lnMt
+
log change in
real U.S./U.K.
exchange rate︸ ︷︷ ︸
lnXt
, (5a)
or equivalently, akin to Eq. (1),
log change in
real U.S./U.K.
exchange rate︸ ︷︷ ︸
lnXt
=
log SDF for asset
returns in real
U.K. pounds︸ ︷︷ ︸
lnMtXt
−
log SDF for asset
returns in real
U.S. dollars︸ ︷︷ ︸
lnMt
, (5b)
Importantly, as Eq. (4) illustrates, this change of numeraire units is a tautology that always
holds, and therefore it does not impose any restrictions (economic or otherwise) on exchange
rates, asset returns, or SDFs that price those asset returns. The change of numeraire units
in Eq. (5) also applies between real and nominal units, and between different nominal units.
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To avoid repetition, we focus exclusively on the real case.
The change of numeraire in Eq. (5) for an SDF has a natural economic interpretation.
An SDF effectively assigns a value to each state of the world. To illustrate, let pi (ω) be the
probability at time t− 1 that state ω occurs at time t. A claim that pays one unit of Amy’s
basket in the U.S. at time t when state ω occurs (i.e., an Arrow-Debreu state contingent
claim) is worth pi (ω)Mt (ω) units of her basket at time t− 1. At time t in state ω, one unit
of Bob’s basket in the U.K. is worth et (ω) units of Amy’s basket in the U.S. Therefore, a
claim that pays one unit of Bob’s basket in the U.K. at time t when state ω occurs is worth
pi (ω)Mt (ω) et (ω) units of Amy’s basket at time t − 1, or equivalently, pi (ω)Mt (ω)Xt (ω)
units of Bob’s basket.
2.2.1 Example for Exponential Affine SDF. In a reduced-form model, the change of
numeraire for an SDF is always the flip side of the change of numeraire for the asset returns
that it prices. To emphasize this connection with an example, consider an exponential affine
SDF, which is used in many papers in the asset pricing literature due to the tractability
it provides. The log of an exponential affine SDF is affine in the log of the asset returns.
Therefore, an exponential SDF for the asset returns denominated in real dollars is given by,
lnMt = −Υ · lnRt − c , for some Υ ∈ Rk such that Υ · 1 = 1 , (6a)
where a ·b denotes the dot product of vectors a and b, and c is such that Eq. (3) is satisfied,
1 = E
[
e−c−Υ·lnRt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mt
Rt | Ft−1
]
=⇒ c = ln 1
k
1 · E[e−Υ·lnRtRt | Ft−1] . (6b)
If we instead denominate the same asset returns in real pounds rather than real dollars,
then the same exponential affine function of those returns is an SDF for the returns, since
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Υ · 1 = 1 implies that Eq. (6) can be written equivalently as
lnMtXt = −Υ · lnRt/Xt − c , where Υ · 1 = 1 . (7)
To emphasize, Υ is the same in Eqs. (6) and (7): only the units that are used to denominate
the asset returns differ. Moreover, the tautology in Eq. (5) obviously holds for this SDF since
lnMtXt − lnMt = Υ · lnRt + c− ln Υ · lnRt/Xt − c = lnXt , (8)
for any Υ such that Υ · 1 = 1.
2.2.2 Example for Long’s Numeraire Portfolio. As another concrete example, con-
sider the SDF associated with the inverse of the return on Long’s numeraire portfolio. Long
(1990) showed that if there are no arbitrage opportunities within a set of asset returns, then
there always exists a portfolio of those assets such that the inverse of the return on that
portfolio is an SDF for the returns on those assets (see also Karatzas and Kardaras, 2007).
That is, under some mild regularity conditions, there always exists an SDF of the form
Mt = (θ ·Rt)−1 , where θ · 1 = 1 . (9)
Therefore, the inverse of the return on a portfolio denominated in real dollars, (θ ·Rt)−1 =
Mt, is an SDF for those asset returns denominated in real dollars. Likewise, if the same asset
returns are instead denominated in real pounds, then the inverse of the (scalar) return on
the same portfolio denominated instead in real pounds, (θ ·Rt/Xt)−1 = MtXt, is that same
SDF for those returns. Again, to emphasize, the portfolio weights θ are the same: only the
units that are used to denominate the returns differ. Also, the tautology in Eq. (5) obviously
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holds for this SDF since
lnMtXt − lnMt = lnθ ·Rt − lnθ ·Rt/Xt = lnXt . (10)
2.3 Projections
In general, there is not a unique SDF that satisfies Eq. (3). For example, if Mt is an SDF
that satisfies Eq. (3) then so too is Mt ξt for any random variable ξt > 0 that is independent
of MtRt with E [ξt | Ft−1] = 1. Therefore,
E [MtRt | Ft−1] = 1 = E
[
M˜tRt | Ft−1
] 6=⇒ Mt = M˜t . (11)
However, if none of the asset returns are redundant (i.e., they are linearly independent) then
there is a unique SDF that is linear in those returns (assuming that it is strictly positive
almost surely). Moreover, this unique linear SDF is equal to the linear projection of any
SDF down onto the asset returns. For example, if Mt and M˜t are SDFs that satisfy Eq. (3)
for the asset returns denominated in real dollars, Rt, then the linear projections of these
SDFs down onto those returns must agree,
proj [Mt ‖ Rt] = β ·Rt = proj
[
M˜t ‖ Rt
]
, (12)
where β = 1
(
E
[
R>t Rt | Ft−1
])−1 ∈ Rk.
2.3.1 Change of Numeraire Units for Linear SDFs. Analogous to Eq. (12), we can
linearly project the same SDFs, MtXt and M˜tXt, down onto the same asset returns denom-
inated instead in real pounds, Rt/Xt,
proj [MtXt ‖ Rt/Xt] = β∗ ·Rt/Xt = proj
[
M˜tXt ‖ Rt/Xt
]
, (13)
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where β∗ = 1
(
E
[
R>t RtX
−2
t | Ft−1
])−1 ∈ Rk. In general, the linear SDFs in Eqs. (12) and
(13) are not the same. To see this result, we first need to express these SDFs in common
units for comparison. If β ·Rt in Eq. (12) is an SDF for the asset returns denominated in
real dollars, then β ·RtXt is that same SDF for the same asset returns denominated instead
in real pounds. However, β · RtXt is not linear in the asset returns denominated in real
pounds, Rt/Xt, but instead it is linear in RtXt. Thus, in general,
β∗ ·Rt/Xt 6= β ·RtXt , (14a)
or equivalently,
lnXt 6= lnβ∗ ·Rt/Xt − lnβ ·Rt . (14b)
Eq. (14) is an example of a much broader point that we make in this section: in general,
Eq. (1) does not hold for separately identified SDFs.
The proof of the inequality in Eq. (14) is quite simple. If there are n > k states of the
world next period, then for any β ∈ Rk, equality in Eq. (14) would represent n equations
with k < n unknowns (i.e., β∗ ∈ Rk), which, in general, does not have a solution.7
2.3.2 Inferences About Different Agents. The inequality in Eq. (14) has important
implications for the international finance literature because many papers incorrectly claim
that it always holds with equality (e.g., see Brandt et al., 2006, p. 675; Brennan and Xia,
2006, p. 759; Lustig and Verdelhan, 2006, p. 648; Alvarez et al., 2007, p. 342; and Lustig and
Verdelhan, 2012, p. 395).8
7More formally, assume that there are n > k states of the world at time t, indexed by ω = 1, . . . , n. For
any β ∈ Rk, in general,
@β∗ ∈ Rk such that β∗ ·Rt (ω) /Xt (ω) = β ·Rt (ω)Xt (ω) , ∀ω = 1, . . . , n .
8For example, Brandt et al. (2006, p. 675) states that:
These discount factors are the projections of any possible domestic and foreign discount factors
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The reason for the significance of the inequality in Eq. (14) is as follows. It is well-known
that the IMRS of any maximizing agent who can frictionlessly trade a set of assets is an SDF
for the returns on those assets.9 For example, consider again the U.K. and U.S. representative
agents Bob and Amy. Suppose that M∗t is Bob’s IMRS over his consumption basket in the
U.K. (i.e., real pounds). To be notationally consistent with Eq. (13), define Mt ≡ M∗t /Xt,
which is Bob’s IMRS, indirectly expressed using Amy’s basket as the numeraire (and note
that M∗t ≡MtXt). Then proj [MtXt ‖ Rt/Xt] = β∗ ·Rt/Xt in Eq. (13) can be economically
interpreted as the part of Bob’s IMRS that is in the linear span of these particular asset
returns denominated in real pounds. Likewise, suppose that M˜t is Amy’s IMRS over her
consumption basket in the U.S. (i.e., real dollars). Then proj
[
M˜t ‖ Rt
]
= β ·Rt in Eq. (12)
can be economically interpreted as the part of Amy’s IMRS that is in the linear span of
the returns on these particular assets denominated in real dollars. Thus, if Eq. (14) always
holds with equality (which it does not), then the change in the real exchange rate would
appear to offer model-free insights into the differences between the IMRSs of agents in the
two countries. Indeed, the papers referenced above make this exact claim.
As an example of how Eq. (14) is used in the literature, Alvarez et al. (2007) claim that it
always holds with equality and they use it to argue that changes in nominal interest rates by
central banks must have a large impact on the difference between the conditional variances
of representative agents’ IMRSs. To be clear, we take no stand on this claim. Rather, our
point is that Eq. (14) cannot be used as the basis for model-free insights into the differences
between IMRSs of agents in two countries.
As another example, Brandt et al. (2006) also incorrectly claim that Eq. (14) always
holds with equality, and they use it to draw model-free inferences about the correlation of
the marginal utility growths of agents in different countries. On page 672 they state that:
onto the relevant spaces of asset payoffs, and they are also the minimum-variance discount
factors. We show that Eq. (1) continues to hold with this particular choice of discount factors.
9We elaborate on this point in Section 3.
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Hansen and Jagannathan showed that marginal utility growths must be highly
volatile in order to explain the equity premium. We show that marginal utility
growths must also be highly correlated across countries in order to explain the
relative smoothness of exchange rates.
This conclusion—described by Brandt et al. (2006) as logically inescapable—has motivated
a new literature that seeks models in which IMRSs are both volatile and highly correlated
(e.g., see Colacito and Croce, 2011 and Stathopoulos, 2011). For example, from Colacito
and Croce (2011, p. 154):
We like to view this as an international equity premium puzzle. In a one-country
model, consumption growth does not vary enough to explain the excess return
over the risk-free rate. In a two-country model, consumption growth does not
covary enough to track movements in the exchange rate and returns. This di-
chotomy of prices and quantities strikes us as an important unresolved puzzle in
international finance.
Again, to be clear, there is nothing inherently wrong with models in which IMRSs are highly
correlated. Rather, our point is that these models do not solve a puzzle: it is impossible to
know from price data alone whether agents’ IMRSs are in fact highly correlated.
Moreover, even if Eq. (14) did hold with equality, it still would not offer model-free
insights into the differences between the IMRSs of agents in the two countries. The reason
is simple. It is impossible to distinguish between different agents’ IMRSs using only the
returns on assets, including currencies, that they can frictionlessly trade with each other: as
the projections in Eqs. (12) and (13) illustrate, agents are observationally equivalent along
that dimension. Moreover, if we only observe the returns on these particular assets then we
cannot say anything about the elements of Bob’s and Amy’s IMRSs that are orthogonal to
(i.e., not in the linear span of) those returns. Instead, the returns on assets that Bob and
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Amy can frictionlessly trade with each other are only informative, alone, about the common
component of their IMRSs (measured in the same units), not about differences.
2.3.3 Complete Markets in Reduced-Form Models. There are two illustrative cases
in which Eq. (14) holds with equality. First, if the change in the exchange rate is deterministic
(or, more generally, the squared change in the exchange rate is deterministic). Second, if
the exchange rate and k asset returns only vary over k distinct events. In that case, there is
a unique SDF within the space of SDFs that only vary over the same events as the returns
on these particular assets.10 Since the SDFs in Eqs. (6), (9), (12), and (13) all only vary
over the same events as the asset returns that they are constructed from, they must all be
equal if there is a unique SDF in that space. In the no-arbitrage asset pricing literature,
this second case is typically referred to as a complete market. It implies that any contingent
claim on these particular assets must have a unique no-arbitrage price because it can be
exactly replicated by trading in those assets.
Many papers in international asset pricing that develop reduced-form models assume
that there is a unique SDF. When that unique SDF is denominated in a country’s (real or
nominal) currency, they economically interpret it as the IMRS of a representative agent in
that country. However, regardless of whether there is a unique SDF in a particular reduced-
form model, the argument in Section 2.3.2 still applies: alone, the returns on assets that
agents can frictionlessly trade with each other can only be informative about the common
component of their IMRSs, not about differences.
Moreover, it is important to recognize that even if these k assets only vary over k distinct
events next period, Amy’s and Bob’s IMRSs can still vary over more than those k events.
In other words, a complete market in a reduced-form model (e.g., k asset returns that only
vary over k distinct events next period) does not imply that the returns on those particular
10More formally, there is a unique SDF within the space of SDFs that are adapted to the minimum
filtration generated by the returns on these particular assets.
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assets completely span agents’ IMRSs. Of course, one is always free to make that additional
assumption; but it is an assumption, not an implication. Moreover, it is an assumption
that cannot be fully tested in a reduced-form model without any agents. Nevertheless, one
testable implication of this assumption is that the expected return on any asset, including
those outside the model, only depends on its covariance with the returns on these k assets.
However, to the best of our knowledge, we are not currently aware of any reduced-form
model of a set of assets that empirically satisfies this criteria.
Perhaps the best known example of a reduced-form model with a complete market is
a binomial tree model for the return on a single asset and a default-free bond (e.g., see
Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein, 1979). In that simple case, there is a unique SDF (or risk-
neutral measure) within the space of SDFs that only vary over two distinct events in the
model. However, although this simple model is useful for valuing contingent claims on that
particular asset, it does not imply that agents’ IMRSs also only vary over those two events.
Another well-known example of a reduced-form model with a complete market is the Black-
Scholes-Merton model (e.g., see Black and Scholes, 1973 and Merton, 1973), which is the
continuous-time limit of the binomial tree model.
Brandt et al. (2006) show that Eq. (14) holds in a continuous-time diffusion setting that
is similar to Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973), which they claim is proof that
Eq. (14) always holds with equality, even if the asset market is incomplete so that there is not
a unique SDF. However, they fail to recognize that their continuous-time diffusion setting
is actually a complete market (e.g., see Harrison and Pliska, 1981, 1983), and therefore
it cannot serve as the basis for a proof that equality in Eq. (14) holds more generally in
incomplete markets. Moreover, to be clear, the inequality in Eq. (14) persists, in general, even
in continuous time.11 Regardless of whether time is discrete or continuous, the fundamental
reason for the inequality in Eq. (14) is that β ·RtXt is not, in general, in the linear space of
11Jarrow and Madan (1995, 1999) highlight that SDFs are not unique in continuous-time models with a
finite number of a securities and jumps that have a continuous distribution.
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the asset returns, Rt/Xt, denominated in real pounds.
12
2.4 Restrictions Imposed by a Change of Numeraire
Many papers in the international asset pricing literature model two (or more) reduced-form
SDFs that are assumed to satisfy Eq. (1).13 In Section 2.2 we showed that Eq. (1) actually
characterizes the change of numeraire for a single SDF. Therefore, these papers do not
actually model different SDFs, but instead they model the same SDF simply denominated
in two different units (e.g., dollars and pounds). There is nothing technically wrong with this
modeling approach: it is always equivalent to model, Xt and Mt, or Xt and MtXt, or Mt and
MtXt. However, as we illustrated in Section 2.2, it is important recognize that the change
of numeraire units in Eq. (1) does not impose any restrictions (economic or otherwise) on
an SDF in a reduced-form model. In other words, Eq. (1) is a tautology in a reduced-form
model, not a testable restriction. Nevertheless, many papers argue that Eq. (1) imposes
important restrictions. For example, in Bakshi et al. (2008, p. 133) they state that:
In particular, because the ratio of the stochastic discount factors in two economies
governs the exchange rate between them, the exchange rate market offers a direct
information source for assessing the relative risk-taking behavior of investors in
international economies.
Below we discuss examples in some well-known papers in this literature. For clarity, we
consider simple cases with bank accounts in two currencies. A more general treatment is
provided in Appendix A.
12Brandt et al. (2006, p. 675) incorrectly claim that β · RtXt is always in the linear space of the asset
returns denominated in real pounds, Rt/Xt. Instead, it is β ·Rt/Xt, not β ·RtXt, that is always in this
linear space.
13Examples of papers that pursue this modeling approach include: Bansal (1997); Backus et al. (2001);
Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002); Brennan and Xia (2006); Brandt et al. (2006); Bakshi et al. (2008); Lustig
et al. (2011); and Lustig et al. (2014).
16
2.4.1 Different Assets. Suppose that we partition the set of assets into two distinct sets.
Let M˜t be an SDF that prices the returns on the first subset of assets, R1,t, denominated in
real dollars. Similarly, let MtXt be an SDF that prices the returns on the second subset of
assets, R2,t/Xt , denominated in real pounds (so that Mt prices those same asset returns,
R2,t, denominated in real dollars). In general, Mt 6= M˜t since they price different sets of
assets, and therefore
lnXt 6= lnMtXt − ln M˜t . (15)
Brennan and Xia (2006) argue that Eq. (15) should hold with equality for an SDF, MtXt,
that prices one set of bond returns denominated in pounds, and an SDF, M˜t, that prices a
different set of bond returns denominated in dollars.
To illustrate the inequality in Eq. (15) with a simple example, suppose that there are
two assets (i.e., k = 2), which are one-period default-free bank accounts denominated in real
dollars and pounds, that pay continuously-compounded interest rates r and r∗, respectively,
from time t− 1 to t.14 Then
R1,t = e
r and R2,t/Xt = e
r∗ . (16)
Therefore, M˜t = e
−r is an SDF that only prices the return on the dollar-denominated bank
account, and Mt = e
−r∗/Xt is an SDF that only prices the return on the pound-denominated
bank account. However, if the real exchange rate at time t isn’t known at time t− 1 (i.e., it
is stochastic), then
lnXt 6= lnMtXt − ln M˜t = ln e−r∗ − ln e−r = r − r∗ . (17)
Therefore, as this simple example illustrates, theory does not imply that Eq. (15) should
14For notational convenience, we omit the time t− 1 subscript on the interest rates, so that r ≡ rt−1 and
r∗ ≡ r∗t−1.
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hold with equality for SDFs that price different sets of assets.
2.4.2 Exponential Affine Structure. Many papers in the international asset pricing
literature work within an exponential affine structure because of the tractability it provides
(e.g., see Backus et al., 2001; Brennan and Xia, 2006; and Lustig et al., 2011). In Section
2.2.1 we showed that the change of units for an exponential affine SDF is also exponential
affine with exactly the same parameters. Nevertheless, many papers in this literature suggest
that exchange rate dynamics impose distinct restrictions on exponential affine models of Mt
and MtXt. For example, from Lustig et al. (2011, p. 26):
We derive new restrictions on the stochastic discount factors (at home and
abroad) that need to be satisfied in order to reproduce the carry trade risk pre-
mium that we have documented in the data.
In this section we explicitly demonstrate that an exponential affine structure does not impose
distinct restrictions on Mt and MtXt.
To illustrate our point with an example, consider again the simple setup in Section 2.4.1
with two assets (i.e., k = 2) that are one-period default-free bank accounts denominated in
real dollars and pounds, that pay continuously-compounded interest rates r and r∗, respec-
tively. In that case, the log asset returns are
lnRt = [r , r
∗ + lnXt] , (18a)
or equivalently,
lnRt/Xt = [r − lnXt , r∗] . (18b)
Assume that the change in the real U.S./U.K. exchange rate is lognormal, so that
lnXt + r
∗ − r = µ+ ν εt , where εt ∼ N (0, 1) , (19)
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and |ν| > 0. Much of the international asset pricing literature focuses on the drift of
exchange rates. For example, one could set µ = α + β
(
r − r∗) in order to incorporate the
forward premium anomaly for this exchange rate (or, more generally, it is straightforward
to incorporate any dependence on interest rates). We suppress any time t− 1 subscripts on
the drift and volatility of the exchange rate purely for ease of exposition below.
Given the default-free interest rates, r and r∗, and the exchange rate dynamics in Eq. (18),
we can construct the SDFs in Eqs. (6), (9), (12), and (13). For this example with lognormal
asset returns, the exponential affine SDF in Eq. (6) is particularly convenient because Υ and
c can be characterized in closed form as
Υ =
[
1
2
− µ
ν2
, 1
2
+ µ
ν2
]
and c = 1
2
(
1
2
+ µ
ν2
)
ν2
(
1
2
− µ
ν2
)
. (20)
For notational convenience, define
γ = 1
2
+ µ
ν2
, or equivalently, 1− γ = 1
2
− µ
ν2
. (21)
Then the exponential affine SDF for this example is given by
lnMt = − (1− γ) r − γ [r∗ + lnXt]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−Υ·lnRt
− 1
2
γ ν2 (1− γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
, (22a)
or equivalently,
lnMtXt = − (1− γ) [r − lnXt]− γ r∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
−Υ·lnRt/Xt
− 1
2
γ ν2 (1− γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
, (22b)
Much of the international asset pricing literature models the simple lognormal change in
the real exchange rate in Eq. (19) by instead parameterizing Mt and MtXt in Eq. (22). To
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illustrate this approach, define
λ = µ
ν
+ 1
2
ν and λ∗ = µ
ν
− 1
2
ν , (23)
so that λ = ν γ and λ∗ = −ν (1− γ). With these alternative labels, Eq. (22) simplifies to
lnMt = −r − λ εt − 12λ2 , (24a)
or equivalently,
lnMtXt = −r∗ − λ∗εt − 12 (λ∗)2 , (24b)
and the lognormal exchange rate dynamics in Eq. (19) can be written as
lnXt + r
∗ − r = 1
2
λ2 − 1
2
(λ∗)2 + (λ− λ∗) εt , (25)
where, again, εt ∼ N (0, 1) according to Eq. (19).
At first glance, it might appear that this alternative parameterization in Eq. (24) does in
fact impose separate restrictions on Mt and MtXt because they depend on different param-
eters. However, as Eq. (23) illustrates, this alternative approach just relabels parameters: λ
and λ∗ in Eq. (24) are simply different ways to specify the mean and volatility of the change
in the exchange rate.
To be clear, our point here is not that the change in the real exchange rate in Eq. (19)
does not impose any restrictions on an SDF: the weights, γ = 1
2
+ µ
ν2
and 1− γ = 1
2
− µ
ν2
, in
Eq. (22) are functions of both the drift and volatility, µ and ν, of the change in the exchange
rate.15 Rather, our point is that Eq. (19) does not impose separate restrictions because the
15Many papers in the international asset pricing literature document the first moment of the return on
a currency investment strategy and then construct an SDF that is consistent with that moment. However,
the first moment (or the higher order moments) of the change in the exchange rate, alone, is not sufficient
to completely characterize an SDF. For example, the drift and volatility, µ and ν, are both necessary to
characterize the SDF in Eq. (22). Indeed, perhaps the main purpose of an SDF is to help shed light on the
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logs of both Mt and MtXt in Eq. (22) are exactly the same affine function of the log asset
returns in Eq. (18): only the numeraire units that are used to the denominate those asset
returns differs. Put differently, Mt and MtXt are the same SDF denominated in different
units, so the same asset returns (including currency returns) can’t possibly impose separate
restrictions on a single SDF.
2.4.3 Spanning of Exchange Rates with Other Assets. In a well-known paper,
Backus et al. (2001) “characterize the (forward premium) anomaly in the context of affine
models of the term structure of interest rates.” On page 280 of Backus et al. (2001) they
state that:
We formulate our models as discrete time processes for currency-specific pricing
kernels—essentially, processes for prices of state-contingent claims—and translate
Fama’s (1984) conditions for risk premiums into restrictions on pricing kernels.
We show that these restrictions have strong implicates for the structure and
parameter values of affine models, and then consider several specific examples.
We find, based on both theory and estimation, that affine models have difficulty
accounting for the anomaly.
In Section 2.4.2 we explicitly demonstrated that one can always construct an exponential
affine SDF from a lognormal exchange rate, even if the forward premium puzzle holds.16
Backus et al. (2001) assume that the change in the exchange rate is lognormally distributed,
so how exactly do they find “that affine models have difficulty accounting for the anomaly”?
The answer is simple: Backus et al. (2001) formulate an affine model of Mt and MtXt, but
in the process of doing so, they implicitly assume that shocks to exchange rates are completely
spanned by shocks to interest rates. More specifically, in the context of our examples above,
relationship between the first moment and the higher order moments of asset returns.
16More general, given any set of lognormal asset returns, one can always construct (i.e., reverse engineer)
an exponential affine SDF from the returns themselves.
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they assume that changes in the dollar and pound default-free interest rates, r and r∗, are
driven by two correlated normal shocks. However, they also assume that Mt and MtXt only
depend on these same two shocks, and therefore they implicitly assume that the change in
the exchange rate, Xt = MtXt/Mt, is driven by exactly the same two shocks as the interest
rates. Many other papers in this literature also make this same implicit assumption (e.g., see
Brandt and Santa-Clara, 2002; Brennan and Xia, 2006; Backus, Gavazzoni, Telmer, and Zin,
2010; Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan, 2011; and Gavazzoni, Sambalaibat, and Telmer,
2013).
It is straightforward to understand the source of the restrictions that Backus et al. (2001)
derive without referring to the specific details of their model. Any dynamic no-arbitrage
model of the term structure of interest rates in two currencies must have at least four assets:
short- and long-term bonds in both currencies. Therefore, there are at least three prices to
consider once we choose one of these assets as the numeraire (e.g., a default-free dollar or
pound bank account). However, if we assume that those three prices are driven by only two
shocks, then one of the three must be redundant, since it can be replicated by a combination
of the other two. It is this redundancy, not Eq. (1) or the forward premium anomaly, that
is in fact the primary source of the restrictions derived in Backus et al. (2001) and other
papers referenced above.17 Put differently, if none of these assets are redundant then the
forward premium anomaly is entirely consistent with an exponential affine SDF.
To be clear, the assumption that changes in exchange rates are completely spanned by
the returns on other assets such as bonds, does not violate a fundamental economic principal
(such as the absence of arbitrage). Therefore, a priori, it is not necessarily wrong to make
17Alone, the absence of arbitrage does not provide strong restrictions on the joint distribution of currency
returns with the returns on other assets. Instead, no-arbitrage only restricts the joint distribution of asset
returns that are exposed to a common (small) set of risks, or shocks. For example, no-arbitrage models
have been particularly fruitful for understanding the relationship between the prices of options with different
strikes and maturities, as well as the term structure of yields on bonds with different maturities (e.g., see
Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973; and Vasicek, 1977). In both of these cases, the absence of arbitrage
is useful for understanding the relative prices of many different securities that are jointly driven by a smaller
set of underlying risks, or shocks.
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this assumption. Our point is simply that it is this assumption, not Eq. (1) or the forward
premium anomaly, that is the primary source of any restrictions that are derived. Ultimately,
it is an empirical question whether currency returns are completely spanned by the returns
on other assets such as bonds in the two currencies. If they are, then it can be useful to
derive no-arbitrage restrictions implied by this spanning. However, if they’re not, then there
is no reason to expect that these no arbitrage restrictions should hold in the data either
(though they might).
To date, the existing empirical evidence suggests that the returns on currency investments
are not completely spanned by the returns on other assets. Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002)
provide empirical evidence that currency returns are not well-spanned by bond returns. In
their empirical section, Lustig et al. (2011) argue that a separate currency factor is necessary
to understand that the cross-section of returns on portfolios of currencies.18 Burnside (2012)
shows that factors that price the cross-section of equity returns do not price the cross-section
of currency returns. Of course, all of this existing empirical evidence does not imply that
there cannot be some, as yet undiscovered, set of asset returns that completely span currency
returns. However, one of the major puzzles in the economics of exchange rates is that,
empirically, time-series variation in exchange rates is not tightly related to contemporaneous
time-series variation in any other variables. Indeed, for this reason, currencies are often
considered to be a separate asset class.
Finally, as noted above, Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) provide empirical evidence that
currency returns are not well-spanned by bond returns. They interpret their empirical results
as evidence that Eq. (1) must not be satisfied. To capture this feature, they model two
18Lustig et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence that equity market volatility has some explanatory power
for the cross-section of currency returns. However, in a horse race they find that their currency-specific
factor drives out the equity volatility factor.
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distinct SDFs, M∗t and M˜t, for the returns on the same assets. They assume that
Xt =
M∗t
M˜t
Ot , (26)
where Ot is independent of M
∗
t , M˜t, and all assets, and E [Ot | Ft−1] = 1.19
The model in Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) violates no arbitrage. To illustrate, note
that M∗t and M˜t must both price a default-free dollar bank account, so that
E
[
M∗t X
−1
t e
r | Ft−1
]
= 1 = E
[
M˜te
r | Ft−1
]
. (27)
However, Eq. (26) together with the assumptions below it are inconsistent with Eq. (27)
since, by Jensen’s inequality,
e−r = E
[
M∗t X
−1
t | Ft−1
]
= E
[
M˜tO
−1
t | Ft−1
]
, (28a)
= E
[
M˜t | Ft−1
]
E
[
O−1t | Ft−1
]
, (28b)
> E
[
M˜t | Ft−1
]
/E
[
Ot | Ft−1
]
, (28c)
= E
[
M˜t | Ft−1
]
= e−r . (28d)
In other words, the model in Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) is not free of arbitrage oppor-
tunities (i.e., it is not internally consistent), since it assigns two different returns to the same
dollar-denominated default-free bank account.20
19See Eq. (24) in Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002, p. 176). They state that “the key insight of our model
is that when markets are incomplete, the volatility of the exchange rate is not uniquely determined by the
domestic and foreign stochastic discount factors. ... If markets are incomplete, the volatility of the exchange
rate can contain an element that is orthogonal to the priced sources of risk in both countries. ... To capture
this excess volatility, we specify a stochastic process for the degree of market incompleteness.”
20Similarly, Anderson, Hammond, and Ramezani (2010) show that, in the special case of an affine setting,
the assumptions in Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) are infeasible. Eq. (26) illustrates that the internal
inconsistency (i.e., the arbitrage opportunity) applies more generally, beyond the specific affine structure.
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3 Structural Models
In Section 2.3.2 we highlighted that in a reduced-form asset pricing model it is impossible to
say anything about differences between agents’ IMRSs (measured in the same units). Models
with more structure, possibly combined with data on quantities, have the potential to allow
us to say something about different agents.
As in Section 2.3.2, let M˜t be Amy’s IMRS, defined over units of her basket, and let M
∗
t
be Bob’s IMRS, defined over units of his basket, between times t − 1 and t. Because it is
useful to compare IMRSs over common units, we again use Mt ≡ M∗t /Xt to denote Bob’s
IMRS, indirectly expressed using Amy’s basket as the numeraire.
Some models assume or imply that Bob and Amy always equate IMRSs (direct or indirect)
measured in units of individual goods or currencies that they can frictionlessly trade. In this
case, we have
Mt = M˜t , or equivalently, M
∗
t = XtM˜t . (29)
What modeling assumptions lead to this result? One might assume that there is a complete
set of state contingent claims denominated in a numeraire that Bob and Amy can friction-
lessly trade. In standard models, as long as Bob and Amy can also frictionlessly trade at
least one consumption good, Eq. (29) emerges from the equilibrium conditions of the model
under this assumption of complete asset markets. Alternatively, there might not be complete
state contingent claims, but the existing asset markets might nonetheless span the variation
in Mt and M˜t in equilibrium. A trivial example would be an endowment economy, with no
asset markets, but perfect correlation of the agents’ endowments.
Eq. (29), or the assumptions that lead to it, can be useful in a variety of ways. First, it
acts as a simple diagnostic. In many cases, M∗ and M˜ are analytic functions of observable
variables. SinceXt is also observable, one can test whether Eq. (29) holds for any values of the
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model parameters. This simple diagnostic can be useful for ruling out specific assumptions
about preferences or market completeness, without first solving the full model. Curiously,
however, we are unaware of any use of this simple diagnostic other than by Backus and
Smith (1993) and Kollmann (1995).
Second, when deriving the model’s equilibrium mapping from state variables and shocks
to prices and quantities, the complete asset markets assumption is useful because it allows
the mapping to be derived from a tractable social planning problem.21 But many researchers
adopt the complete markets assumption without using it in this way. For example, Verdelhan
(2010), Colacito and Croce (2011), Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) and Gourio, Siemer,
and Verdelhan (2013), model equilibrium consumption realizations in the two economies as
exogenous processes, which effectively makes M˜t and M
∗
t exogenous. They then assume that
Eq. (29) holds and solve for the implicit change in the real exchange rate.
On the positive side, we view this approach as a diagnostic test, though a less direct one
than a test of Eq. (29), for the models in these papers. In particular, if the consumption
processes used to model M˜t and M
∗
t are empirically realistic, and Eq. (29) is assumed to
hold, then this approach can be used to ask if the implied Xt is empirically realistic.
Although we recognize the potential value of this approach for model diagnosis, we would
argue that it has serious limitations. For example, because consumption processes and
exchange rates are actually jointly determined in these models, this diagnostic approach
is uninformative about how exchange rates are determined, and why they behave as they
do. To illustrate this point, in Appendix B we outline a simple two country model with
exogenous endowments of two goods. In the complete markets version of that model, with
both goods being frictionlessly traded, exchange rates move in response to variation in the
relative global endowments of the two goods, but only if agents have different preferences
21See, to name but a few examples, Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992),
Devereux, Gregory, and Smith (1992), Backus and Smith (1993), Tesar (1993), Baxter and Crucini (1995),
Stockman and Tesar (1995), Backus and Crucini (2000), Kose and Yi (2006), Bodenstein (2008), Burstein,
Kurz, and Tesar (2008), Stathopoulos (2011) and Colacito, Croce, Ho, and Howard (2013).
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for the two goods. On the other hand, if one of the goods is nontraded, but agents have
identical preferences, exchange rates move in response to differences in the growth rates of
the local endowments of the nontraded good. The point is that the mechanism via which
exchange rates move is entirely different in these two cases, and Eq. (29) alone is incapable
of distinguishing them. Instead, one must solve the social planning problem.22
Additionally, in some cases, Eq. (29) is not actually an implication of the model. For
example, Colacito and Croce (2011) use a two good model with complete home bias in
preferences. In this setting, the real exchange rate is indeterminate, since households in
the two economies consume their endowments regardless of their relative price. Verdelhan
(2010) and Gourio, Siemer, and Verdelhan (2013) use single good models, but rule out the
possibility of trade between the two economies. If trade is not ruled out, of course, the real
exchange rate in these economies is always 1, but if it is ruled out, again, the real exchange
rate is indeterminate.23
In many international asset pricing exercises, we are interested in understanding the
expected excess returns to currency investments. For these exercises, the good news is that
it actually doesn’t matter whether or not Eq. (29) holds, because one is more interested
in Eq. (3). When Eq. (29) fails, this could either be because the model of preferences is
incorrect, or because asset markets are incomplete. If it is the latter, then M˜t and M
∗
t may
still correctly price the returns to currency investments measured, respectively, in units of
Amy’s and Bob’s baskets. In other words, Eq. (3) can still hold for both Mt and M˜t even if
22Stathopoulos (2011) solves a complete model analogous to our first example, except that agents’ pref-
erences display habit formation over an aggregate that displays home bias. Colacito et al. (2013) solve a
model of a production economy in which agents have Epstein-Zin preferences that display home bias, and
the levels of technology follow processes in the spirit of the long-run risk literature. In both cases, these
authors’ preference specifications are guided by Hansen and Jagannathan’s evidence that IMRSs must be
volatile to be consistent with asset prices.
23The internet appendix to Verdelhan (2010) is revealing in this regard, because endowments rather
than consumptions are assumed to be exogenous. In this case, proportional and quadratic trade costs
are introduced to force the real exchange rate away from 1, as in Dumas (1992). When these costs are
sufficiently big, the real exchange rate is pinned down by a static trade equilibrium. When they are small,
the real exchange rate is, again, indeterminate, although Verdelhan sets it, arbitrarily, equal to the ratio of
marginal utilities of consumption in the two economies.
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Eq. (29) does not hold (which is simply a restatement of Eq. (11) in Section 2.3).
4 Risk Sharing
In this section we discuss the claim in Brandt et al. (2006) that the behavior of exchange
rates reveals the degree of risk sharing across countries. Before we discuss risk sharing, we
must first settle on a definition. Like Colacito and Croce (2011, p. 156), we think a natural
definition of perfect risk sharing is that Amy and Bob equate IMRSs over all individual
goods and services in every state of the world and at every point in time.24 This definition
of perfect risk sharing is not equivalent to asset markets being complete, nor, similarly, is it
equivalent to an allocation that coincides with the solution to a social planner’s problem that
respects market frictions. In either of these situations, risk sharing will be as good as it can
be, but frictions may prevent IMRSs over some goods (e.g., nontraded goods) being equated.
Our definition, instead, means that risk sharing is perfect in a model with complete asset
markets and frictionless trade in all goods.25 Our definition also means that risk sharing
is likely to be imperfect in a model with incomplete asset markets and/or goods market
frictions.
To measure the extent of risk sharing, Brandt et al. (2006) consider the variance of the
difference between lnM∗ and ln M˜ , relative to the sum of the variances of lnM∗ and ln M˜ :26
RSI = 1− var(lnM
∗ − ln M˜)
var(lnM∗) + var(ln M˜)
. (30)
24To be consistent with the literature that we are critiquing, we focus exclusively on the notion of risk
sharing in a purely theoretical sense. Essentially, we’re interested in how much of the total risk can agents
theoretically share. One might also be interested in the empirical question of whether agents do in fact share
as much risk as theoretically possible, but we do not consider that issue.
25The importance of defining terminology is highlighted by the fact that ours is not universally accepted.
For example, Stathopoulos (2011) defines perfect risk sharing between Amy and Bob as the equality of M˜
and M∗. His model assumes complete markets and frictionless trade, so we would describe it as a model
with perfect risk sharing. Instead, he would describe it as a model with imperfect risk sharing arising from
agents’ home bias.
26The index is the same as the correlation between lnM∗ and ln M˜ when they have the same variance.
28
If Eq. (29) holds, then the difference between ln M˜ and lnM∗ measured in different units
must have the same volatility as the change of units, i.e., var(ln M˜ − lnM∗) = var(lnX).
Real exchange rate data tell us that var(lnX) is on the order of 0.01 to 0.02 for major
currency pairs. To measure the denominator in RSI, Brandt et al. (2006) use lower bounds on
var(ln M˜) and var(lnM∗) from Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), where IMRSs are projected
onto vectors of asset returns. In this sense, their calculated RSI is a lower bound for the
actual RSI. In practice, for projections onto risk free assets and broad portfolios of equities,
the implied bounds imply that var(IMRS) ≥ 0.25 at an annual frequency. Thus, empirically,
RSI in Eq. (29) is close to 1 and Brandt et al. (2006) conclude that international risk sharing
must be quite high. On page 673 of Brandt et al. (2006) they state:
Yet the conclusion is hard to escape. Our calculation uses only price data, and
no quantity data or economic modeling (utility functions, income or productivity
shock processes, and so forth). A large degree of international risk sharing is an
inescapable logical conclusion of Eq. (1), a reasonably high equity premium (over
1%, as we show below), and the basic economic proposition that price ratios
measure marginal rates of substitution.
We take issue with the analysis in Brandt et al. (2006) on several grounds, although all
of these objections center on the question of whether price data, alone, can be informative
about risk sharing. First, Eq. (29) holds whenever the available asset returns completely
span agents’ IMRSs. However, if the available asset returns completely span Amy’s and
Bob’s IMRSs and they face identical prices for the goods and services in their baskets, then
risk sharing is perfect (since they can equate IMRSs over all goods and services). Yet the
exchange rate can still vary if they have different preferences over goods, and, therefore,
different consumption baskets. So, unless one assumes that Amy and Bob’s consumption
baskets are identical, it is impossible to infer anything about risk sharing, as we have defined
it.
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Second, Eq. (29) is not guaranteed to hold if the available asset returns do not completely
span agents’ IMRSs. Brandt et al. (2006) claim that in this case it holds for the minimum
variance projections of Amy’s and Bob’s IMRSs down onto the space of asset returns denom-
inated in real dollars and pounds respectively. In Section 2.3.1 we showed that this claim
is incorrect. Therefore, if markets are incomplete, exchange rates alone are not informative
about the difference between Amy’s and Bob’s IMRSs. For example, if the composition of
Amy’s and Bob’s consumption baskets is the same and they face identical prices for the
goods and services in their baskets, then the real exchange rate is always constant. Yet,
risk sharing can still be arbitrarily imperfect if the available asset returns returns do not
completely span agents’ IMRSs (i.e., asset markets are incomplete).
Consistent with our main message in the paper, asset returns alone can provide useful
information about how much risk is shared, but any measure of risk sharing also requires
a measure of the amount of unshared risk. Of course, one is always free to introspect,
as Brandt et al. (2006) do in Sec. 3.5 of their paper, on how much unshared risk seems
“reasonable”. Our view is that this introspection is merely speculative if additional data
and theory are not brought into the picture. Additionally, this introspection has nothing to
do with, and is not informed by, exchange rates. We know, from Hansen and Jagannathan’s
lower bounds, that the representative agents of Minnesota and North Carolina have highly
volatile IMRSs. Brandt et al.’s introspection about incomplete markets applies equally well
to these agents, but it involves imposing an a priori upper limit on the volatility of these
IMRSs as in Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000).
Table 1 summarizes our critique of Brandt et al.’s inference about international risk shar-
ing. Contrary to the premise of this paper, the interpretation of RSI in Eq. (30) as a measure
of international risk sharing actually requires strong assumptions about the underlying eco-
nomic model. In particular, it only holds if agents choose identical consumption baskets and
the available asset returns completely span their IMRSs. In that one special case, frictions
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in the goods market (not the asset market) are the only source of both imperfect risk sharing
and variation in the real exchange rate.
Composition of
Consumption Baskets
Asset Markets Identical Different
Complete Yes No
Incomplete No No
Table 1: Does a variable real exchange rate directly reflect imperfect risk sharing?
How might one address our critique? First and foremost, an economic model is required
to measure M∗ and M˜ in Eq. (29). As we argued, in general, prices alone are not informative
about the difference between these two objects. However, this exercise certainly does not
require a fully-specified multi-country model. For example, it is perfectly reasonable to
measure M∗ and M˜ using a utility function for the representative agent in each country
measured over aggregate consumption in that country.27 In fact, a fully-specified multi-
country model could easily be considered as over-kill if the task is simply to measure M∗
and M˜ .
Second, to consider the question of risk sharing, agent’s IMRS must be measured and
compared in common units. For example, RSI in Eq. (29) could be adjusted to either
RSI = 1− var(lnM
∗ − ln M˜X)
var(lnM∗) + var(ln M˜X)
, (31)
or
RSI = 1− var(lnM
∗/X − ln M˜)
var(lnM∗/X) + var(ln M˜)
. (32)
Even still, Eqs. (31) and (32) are not ideal measures of risk sharing. For example, in Eq. (31),
M∗/X is Bob’s IMRS, indirectly expressed using Amy’s basket as the numeraire. However,
27We agree with Brandt et al. (2006) that the model of the IMRS adopted for this purpose ought to be,
at least, consistent with Hansen and Jagannathan’s lower bounds on volatility.
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it is only Bob’s IMRS over units of Amy’s basket in the U.K. if there are no goods market
frictions so that Amy’s basket has the same price in both countries. Simply put, unless
Amy’s and Bob’s consumption baskets are identical, Eqs. (31) and (32) ignore the extent of
imperfect risk sharing that is due to goods market frictions.28 Furthermore, we feel that it is
important to be cognizant of that fact that, in general, Eqs. (31) and (32) are not the same.
In other words, RSI as a measure of risk sharing depends on the the numeraire that is used
to measure and compare agents’ IMRSs. The numerator in the fractions in Eqs. (31) and
(32) does not depend on the choice of numeraire, since
lnM∗ − ln M˜X ≡ lnM∗/X − ln M˜ . (33)
However, in general, the denominators in those fractions differ, and therefore so do Eqs. (31)
and (32).
5 Conclusion
The log-change in the exchange rate between two economies can always be expressed as the
log difference between an SDF denominated in the currency units of those economies. In a
reduced-form model, this relationship merely characterizes the change of units for an SDF.
In structural models with complete asset markets, the log-change of the real exchange rate
is equal to the log-difference between IMRSs that may be economically distinct, but only if
there are goods market frictions.
We argue that reduced-form no-arbitrage models of the exchange rate are more transpar-
ent if they specify a single SDF and a model of exchange rate dynamics. Structural modelers
28One could assess the extent of imperfect risk sharing due to goods market frictions by digging down
to the micro level on prices and studying the construction of the CPIs in detail. Otherwise, a model of
preferences in the goods market is necessary because it’s impossible to tell from aggregate price indices
whether differences across countries reflect preference differences (i.e., different composition of baskets) or
price differences at the micro level. Models pin this decomposition down (by assumption).
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who adopt the assumption of complete asset markets can use Eq. (29) as a diagnostic test
that does not require a completely specified model (including the details of any goods mar-
ket frictions). However, if one wishes to make further progress towards understanding how
exchange rates are determined and why they vary, this diagnostic alone is not adequate: one
must solve a fully specified model.
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A Section 2.4 Appendix
In Section 2.4 we discussed restrictions on reduced-form no-arbitrage model that are imposed
by a change of numeraire. In that section, for simplicity, we focused on simple examples with
default-free bank accounts in two currencies. Here, we extend that analysis to consider more
assets.
To begin, we augment the returns vector in Eq. (18) with two additional assets that are
not default-free bank accounts. They could be long-term bonds, stocks, or any other assets
located anywhere in the world. Let Yt be the dollar-denominated price of the first additional
asset, and assume that it pays a continuously-compounded dividend δy. Similarly, let Z∗t
be the pound-denominated price of the second additional asset, and assume that it pays a
continuously-compounded dividend δz. The vector of dollar-denominated gross return son
these four assets is
lnRt = [r , r
∗ + ∆ lnSt , δy + ∆ lnYt , δz + ∆ lnZ∗t + ∆ lnSt] , (34)
where, for notational convenience, ∆ lnSt ≡ lnSt − lnSt−1 ≡ lnXt, ∆ lnYt ≡ lnYt − lnYt−1,
and ∆ lnZ∗t ≡ lnZ∗t − lnZ∗t−1.
A common assumption in this literature (and asset pricing in general) is that the asset
returns are log-normally distributed, with
[∆ lnSt , ∆ lnYt , ∆ lnZ
∗
t ] ∼ N (µ ,Ω) . (35a)
We’ll decompose the covariance matrix as Ω ≡ ΣPΣ, with
Σ ≡

σ
σy
σz
 and P ≡

1 ρy ρz
ρy 1 ρ
ρz ρ 1
 . (35b)
To ensure that there are no arbitrage opportunities within the asset returns (as we’ll discuss
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below), it is convenient to parameterize the mean vector, µ, as
µ> ≡

r − r∗ + ϕ − 1
2
σ2
r − δy + ϕy − 12σ2y
r∗ − δz + ϕz − 12σ2z − σzσρz
 (35c)
where
[ϕ , ϕy , ϕz] ≡ Γ Ω and Γ ≡ [γ + γz , γy , γz] , (35d)
for parameters γ, γy, and γz. In Section A.1 we use this illustrative no-arbitrage model to
analyze specific papers in this literature, but first we briefly discuss its relevant features.
In the general case, this simple model of log-normal asset returns has 13 free param-
eters. The continuously-compounded dividend yields on the four assets are described by
{r, r∗, δy, δz}. There are three relative asset returns to consider (once we arbitrarily choose
one of the assets, or a portfolio of them, as the numeraire to denominate returns). The
volatility of the three asset returns are described by
{
σ, σy, σz
}
, which are contained within
the matrix Σ. The correlation of the three asset returns are described by
{
ρy, ρz, ρ
}
, which
are contained within the matrix P . Finally, given the other parameters, the mean of the
three log asset returns are characterized by the parameters
{
γ, γy, γz
}
, which are contained
within the vector Γ.
For this example, we’ll focus on the specific SDF in Eq. (6), since it is used by much of
the literature that works with log-normal models of asset returns. It is straightforward to
verify that 1 = E [MtRt | Ft−1] for the SDF in Eq. (6) when
Υ ≡ [1− γ − γy − γz , γ , γy , γz] , (36)
for γ, γy, and γz in Eq. (35d). By the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing (e.g., see Dybvig
and Ross, 2003 or Dybvig and Ross, 2008), there are no arbitrage opportunities within a set of
returns R if there is a strictly positive SDF, M , that satisfies Eq. (1) for those returns. Thus,
the parameterization in Eq. (35) ensures that there are no arbitrage opportunities within the
asset returns, R, in Eq. (34). Put differently, the absence of arbitrage opportunities does
not impose any restrictions on the 13 parameters, {r, r∗, δy, δz, σ, σy, σz, ρy, ρz, ρ, γ, γy, γz}, in
Eq. (35).
It is important to recognize that, in general, the SDF in Eq. (6) is not the unique SDF
consistent with the returns. For example, the SDF in Eq. (9) is also consistent with the
returns, and it differs from the SDF in Eq. (6) when there is a continuous state space in
discrete time with a finite number of asset returns. However, the continuous-time counterpart
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of this model with log-normal returns does have a unique SDF (e.g., see Harrison and Pliska,
1981, 1983). That continuous-time counterpart of Eq. (35) is given by,
d lnSt =
(
r − r∗ + ϕ− 1
2
σ2
)
dt+ σ dWt , (37a)
d lnYt =
(
r − δy + ϕy − 12σ2y
)
dt+ σy dW
y
t , (37b)
d lnZ∗t =
(
r∗ − δz + ϕz − 12σ2z − σzσρz
)
dt+ σz dW
z
t , (37c)
where W , W y, and W z are Brownian motions with correlation matrix P in Eq. (35b). The
continuous-time dynamics of the unique dollar-denominated SDF for the asset returns in
Eq. (37) are
dMt = −Mt
[
r dt+
(
γ + γz
)
σ dWt + γy σy dW
y
t + γz σz dW
z
t
]
, (38a)
and the continuous-time dynamics of that same unique SDF when the returns are instead
denominated in pounds are
d
(
MtSt
)
= −(MtSt)[r∗dt+ (γ + γz − 1)σ dWt + γy σy dW yt + γz σz dW zt ] . (38b)
It is important to recognize that uniqueness of the SDF in this case requires both continuous-
time and continuous sample paths (i.e., a continuous diffusion without any jumps).29
As we highlighted in Section 2.4.2, much (if not most) of the international asset pricing
literature uses an alternative, but equivalent, parameterization of the log-normal asset return
dynamics in Eq. (35). Rather than model the three asset returns directly, these papers
instead model the returns on the two assets that are not bank accounts, together with an
SDF denominated in both dollars and pounds. In Section 2.4.2 we argued that these two
modeling approaches are isomorphic to each other. In particular, using Eq. (35) and the SDF
in Eq. (6) we can write
[lnMt , lnMt + ∆ lnSt , ∆ lnYt , ∆ lnZ
∗
t ] ∼ N (µM ,ΩM) , (39a)
29Jarrow and Madan (1995, 1999) highlight that SDFs are not unique in continuous-time models with a
finite number of a securities and jumps that have a continuous distribution.
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with
µ>M ≡

−r − 1
2
Γ Ω Γ>
−r∗ − 1
2
Γ∗Ω Γ∗>
r − δy + ϕy − 12σ2y
r∗ − δz + ϕz − 12σ2z − σzσρz
 , (39b)
and
ΩM ≡

Γ Ω Γ> Γ Ω Γ∗> −ϕy −ϕz
Γ∗Ω Γ> Γ∗Ω Γ∗> −ϕ∗y −ϕ∗z
−ϕy −ϕ∗y σy σyσzρ
−ϕz −ϕ∗z σyσzρ σ2z
 , (39c)
where, for notational convenience, we’ve defined the analog of Eq. (35d) as
Γ∗ ≡ [γ + γz − 1 , γy , γz] and
[
ϕ∗ , ϕ∗y , ϕ
∗
z
] ≡ Γ∗Ω . (39d)
Note that, with these definitions,
[
ϕ− ϕ∗ , ϕy − ϕ∗y , ϕz − ϕ∗z
] ≡ [σ2 , σy σρy , σz σρz] . (40)
Papers that parameterize the model using Eq. (39) instead of Eq. (35) often attach differ-
ent labels to the variables and parameters. For example, MtSt/St−1 ≡MtXt is often labeled
as M∗ or . Other parameters that are often given different labels include
λ = σ
(
γ + γz
)
, λy = σy γy , λz = σz γz , (41a)
λ∗ = σ
(
γ + γz − 1
)
= λ− σ , λ∗y = λy − σρd , λ∗z = λz − σρz . (41b)
These two parameterizations are exactly equivalent, since one can always recover the original
parameters in Eq. (35) as
σ = λ− λ∗ , ρy = λy−λ
∗
y
λ−λ∗ , ρz =
λz−λ∗z
λ−λ∗ , (42a)
γ + γz =
λ
λ−λ∗ , γy = σ
−1
y λy , γz = σ
−1
z λz . (42b)
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Obviously different parameterizations of the same no-arbitrage model are innocuous.
However, much of this literature attaches different economic interpretations to this alterna-
tive modeling approach and parameterization. For example, even though there are not any
agents in no-arbitrage models, λ, λy, and λz are often interpreted as market prices of risk
that apply to domestic (U.S.) investors, while λ∗, λ∗y, and λ
∗
z are viewed as market prices
of risk that apply to foreign (U.K.) investors. Moreover, many papers use language which
suggests that M and MtSt/St−1 ≡ MtXt are different SDFs that are associated with differ-
ent economies. For example, Bakshi et al. (2008) provide a no-arbitrage model using this
alternative approach and on page 135 they write:
In complete markets, the stochastic discount factor for each economy is unique.
Hence, the ratio of two stochastic discount factors uniquely determines the ex-
change rate dynamics between the two economies.
Similarly, Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) also provide a no-arbitrage model and on page 173
they write:
The key insight of our model is that when markets are incomplete, the volatility
of the exchange rate is not uniquely determined by the domestic and foreign
stochastic discount factors.
Again, to emphasize, the model in Eq. (35) only imposes that there are no arbitrage oppor-
tunities between these four assets. There are no agents or separate economies. There is no
requirement that the asset market is complete. There is no economic mechanism in the no-
arbitrage model that determines the exchange rate. Eqs. (39) and (23) provide an alternative
parameterization of this same no-arbitrage model, but an alternative parameterization does
not alter any of these statements.
Without loss of generality, for the remainder of this section we’ll work with the model
formulation in Eq. (35) because our view is that it affords the most transparent analysis.
A.1 Literature Discussion
Backus et al. (2001) was one of the first papers to consider a model of the form in Eq. (35).
In their setup, Y is the price of a dollar-denominated long-term bond and Z∗ is the price
of a pound-denominated long-term bond. They argue that the forward premium anomaly
for currencies, together with the restriction of no arbitrage, has “strong implications for the
structure and parameter values of affine models.” The forward premium anomaly pertains
to the mean of the change in the log exchange rate. In particular,
ϕ− 1
2
σ2 = α + β
(
r − r∗) . (43)
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To understand the source of the restrictions that Backus et al. (2001) derive, it is first
important to recognize that if the covariance matrix, Ω, in Eq. (35) is invertible, then the
absence of arbitrage does not impose any restrictions on the model. In that case, the vector
of mean log asset returns, µ, could literally be anything and one can still solve for γ, γd, and
γf in Eq. (35) as
[γ + γz , γy , γz] (44)
=
(
µ− [r − r∗ − 1
2
σ2 , r − δy − 12σ2y , r∗ − δz − 12σ2z − σzσρz
])
Ω−1 .
The intuition behind the lack of no arbitrage restrictions is straightforward. If the covariance
matrix is invertible, then the three asset returns are driven by three linearly independent
shocks. The absence of arbitrage only restricts the returns on assets that are exposed to the
same shocks.
Thus, if the covariance matrix, Ω, in Eq. (35) is invertible (i.e., nonsingular) then the
model is completely free to match the forward premium anomaly (i.e., no-arbitrage does not
impose any restrictions on the model that prevent it from matching the forward premium
anomaly). Backus et al. (2001) assume that the covariance matrix, Ω, is singular so that
the three asset returns are driven by only two sources of uncertainty. The restrictions they
derive are primarily driven by this assumption. Intuitively, a singular covariance matrix
implies that the return on any of the four assets can be exactly replicated by trading in the
other three (i.e., one of the four assets is redundant). For example, if the covariance matrix
is singular, then the pound-denominated bank account could be exactly replicated with
a portfolio of the two non-bank account assets and the dollar-denominated bank account.
Therefore, the return on the pound-denominated bank account must exactly match the
return on the portfolio that replicates it.
To illustrate, if
1− ρ2y − ρ2z − ρ2 + 2ρyρzρ = 0 , (45)
then the correlation matrix, P , in Eq. (35) is singular and can be written as
P =

ρy−ρzρ
1−ρ2
ρy−ρzρ
1−ρ2
1 0
0 1

 1 ρ
ρ 1


ρy−ρzρ
1−ρ2
ρz−ρyρ
1−ρ2
1 0
0 1

>
. (46)
Therefore, in the continuous-time limit,30 one can replicate the pound-denominated bank
30Technically speaking, the covariance matrix of the log of the returns is singular, not the covariance
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account using a portfolio with weights ωy in the dollar-denominated asset (that is not a bank
account), ωz in the pound-denominated asset (that is not a bank account), and 1− ωy − ωz
in the dollar-denominated bank account, where
ωy =
(
ρy − ρzρ
)
σσz[(
ρz − ρyρ
)
σ +
(
1− ρ2)σz]σy , and (47a)
ωz =
(
ρz − ρyρ
)
σ(
ρz − ρyρ
)
σ +
(
1− ρ2)σz . (47b)
With some algebra, one can verify that ωy and ωz solve the replicating problem since
[
ωz , ωy , ωz
]
Σ

ρy−ρzρ
1−ρ2
ρy−ρzρ
1−ρ2
1 0
0 1
 (48)
=
[
1 , 0 , 0
]
Σ

ρy−ρzρ
1−ρ2
ρz−ρyρ
1−ρ2
1 0
0 1
 .
The model in Eq. (37), which is the continuous-time limit of the model in Eq. (35), nat-
urally incorporates this no-arbitrage restriction. In particular, Eq. (48) implies that
[ωz , ωy , ωz] Ω = [1 , 0 , 0] Ω , (49)
and therefore
E
[
(1− ωy − ωz) r dt+ ωy
(
dYt
Yt
+ δy dt
)
+ ωz
(
d (Z∗t St)
(Z∗t St)
+ δz dt
)
| Ft
]
,
=
(
r +
[
ωz , ωy , ωz
]
ΩΓ>
)
dt , (50a)
=
(
r +
[
[1 , 0 , 0]
]
ΩΓ>
)
dt = E
[
dSt
St
+ r∗ dt | Ft
]
. (50b)
That is, the return on the pound-denominated bank account exactly matches the return
matrix of the gross returns. Therefore, there is only exact replication in the continuous-time limit of the
model (i.e., as ∆t→ 0).
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on the portfolio that replicates it. Equivalently, the singular covariance matrix in Eq. (46)
implies that one of the elements (or a linear combination of the elements) in Γ is redundant
and can be set to zero. For example, if Eq. (46) holds then the first element of Γ could be
set to zero, since
 ρy−ρzρ1−ρ2 1 0
ρz−ρyρ
1−ρ2 0 1
ΣΓ>
=
 ρy−ρzρ1−ρ2 1 0
ρz−ρyρ
1−ρ2 0 1
Σ

0
(ρy−ρzρ)σ
(1−ρ2)σy (γ + γz) + γy
(ρz−ρyρ)σ
(1−ρ2)σz (γ + γz) + γy
 . (51)
Eqs. (46) and (51) effectively reduce the number of free parameters in the general model of
Eq. (37) from 13 down to 11.
There are a couple of points worth emphasizing. First, Backus et al. (2001) assume that
currency returns are completely spanned by long-term bond returns in the two currencies
(i.e., currencies and interest rates are driven by the same shocks). This spanning assumption
(i.e., a singular covariance matrix) is the primary source of the no-arbitrage restrictions that
they derive, but it is not an implication of the absence of arbitrage opportunities.31 When
the dollar/pound exchange rate is indirectly modeled via an SDF denominated in both
dollars and pounds, this assumption, and its importance, may be less transparent. Second,
as we illustrated above, an SDF in not necessary to understand or derive the no-arbitrage
restrictions in Backus et al. (2001), because those restrictions follows immediately from a
simple static replication problem in Eq. (48). Put differently, given the assumption of a
singular covariance matrix, one can derive the restrictions implied by no-arbitrage, without
specifying, or explicitly solving for, an SDF. Third, as we have shown, the singular correlation
matrix in Eq. (46) immediately implies (via no arbitrage) that the expected return on the
exchange rate is directly related to the expected return on long-term bonds in the two
currencies according to Eq. (50). Backus et al. (2001) find that the restriction in Eq. (50) has
undesirable features that do not match the data well. It seems most natural to start by testing
whether correlation matrix is close to singular (i.e., test whether exchange rates are spanned
by movements in the two long-term bonds denominated in their respective currencies). If
the covariance matrix is not singular then one should not expect the restriction in Eq. (50)
to hold (since it relies on a singular covariance matrix).
Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) provide empirical evidence that exchange rates are not
31Lustig et al. (2011) also assume that currency returns are completely spanned by long-term bond returns
(i.e., they assume that currencies and interest rates are driven by the same shocks) .
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spanned by movements in long-term bonds in both currencies. They interpret this empirical
evidence as an indication that the asset market is incomplete, so that there is not a unique
SDF. As we described in Section 2.4.3, Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) model two separate
SDFs, M˜ and M∗, together with a third stochastic process, O, that they claim captures
the degree of market incompleteness. On page 164 they state that the stochastic process,
O, in their model captures the notion that “if markets are incomplete, the volatility of the
exchange rate can contain an element that is orthogonal to the priced sources of risk in both
countries.”
In Section 2.4.3 we illustrated that the model in Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) is not
arbitrage-free. Here we describe the restrictions that their model imposes relative to the
general model that we provided in Eq. (35). First, based on their empirical evidence that
exchange rates are not spanned by interest rates, they relax Eq. (45) and allow for a non-
singular correlation/covariance matrix. However, as we illustrated in Eqs. (37) and (38),
there is a unique SDF in the continuous-time diffusion counterpart of the model in Eq. (35),
even when the correlation/covariance matrix is nonsingular. In other words, the fact that
currency returns are not well-spanned by the returns on other assets does not imply that the
market is incomplete or that there is not a unique SDF in a no-arbitrage model.
Second, regardless of whether the market is complete or incomplete, the exchange rate
cannot contain an element that is orthogonal to an SDF denominated in both dollars and
pounds (in the language of Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002), the exchange rate cannot contain
an element that is orthogonal to the priced sources of risk in both countries). This assump-
tion in Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) is the source of the arbitrage opportunity that we
demonstrated in Eq. (28). As an alternative proof of that result (and a less general proof
than the one we provided in Section 2.4.3), note that Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) use
the alternative parametrization in Eq. (23). They argue that if the market is incomplete,
then it can be the case that λ = 0 = λ∗ and the change in the exchange rate can con-
tain an element that is orthogonal to both M∗ and M˜ . As Eqs. (28) and (42) illustrate, λ
and λ∗ can only be equal if σ = 0. It is true that it can be the case that either λ = 0 or
λ∗ = 0 (i.e., either σ (γ + γz) = 0 or σ (γ + γz − 1) = 0), but Jensen’s inequality ensures that
both conditions cannot hold simultaneously unless σ = 0. If we overlook this error in their
model, Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) effectively relax Backus et al. (2001)’s assumption of
a singular covariance matrix in Eq. (46). However, they still restrict the general model in
Eq. (35) by assuming that shocks to exchange rates that are independent of shocks to other
assets must also be independent of SDFs that are consistent with the returns on those assets.
Again, as the the general model in Eq. (35) illustrates, this restriction is not an implication
of no-arbitrage or (in)complete markets.
As a third and final example we consider the paper by Brennan and Xia (2006). They
estimate an SDF, M˜ , that is consistent with the dollar-denominated returns on the dollar-
denominated default-free bank account and long-term dollar-denominated bonds. Separately,
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they estimate an SDF, MX ≡ M∗, for the pound-denominated returns on the pound-
denominated default-free bank account and long-term pound-denominated bonds. Then
they test whether Eq. (17) holds with equality for these two, separately identified, SDFs.
For ease of exposition, we’ll translate the exercise in Brennan and Xia (2006) to the
continuous-time counterpart in Eq. (37) of the general model in Eq. (35).32 Let Y denote
the dollar price of a dollar-denominated long-term bond, and let Z∗ denote the pound price of
a pound-denominated long-term bond. Let M˜ denote the SDF is that is consistent with the
dollar-denominated returns on the dollar-denominated bank account and long-term bond.
Then the dynamics of Mˇ are given by
dM˜t = −M˜t {r dt+ [ρy σ (γ + γz) + σyγy + ρ σzγz] dW yt } . (52)
Similarly, let M∗ denote the SDF is that is consistent with the pound-denominated returns
on the pound-denominated bank account and long-term bond. Then the dynamics of M∗
are given by
dM∗t = −M∗t {r∗ dt+ [ρz σ (γ + γz − 1) + ρ σyγy + σzγz] dW zt } . (53)
Brennan and Xia (2006) claim that if capital markets are integrated then exchange rate
dynamics should follow
d lnSt = d lnM
∗
t − d ln M˜t . (54)
From Eqs. (52–54), it is clear that Brennan and Xia (2006) inherit Backus et al. (2001)’s
assumption that shocks to currencies are completely spanned by shocks to interest rates in
each currency. However, Brennan and Xia (2006) make a much stronger assumption: they
assume that Eq. (1) holds for SDFs that can be identified using distinct sets assets. From
Eqs. (52–54), this additional assumption reduces the number of free parameters from 11 in
Backus et al. (2001) down to 4 (5 if we also include the unspecified correlation between
W y and W z) in Brennan and Xia (2006). Instead, as we illustrated in Section 2, Eq. (1)
simply characterizes the change of numeraire units for an SDF that prices the same assets
denominated in different units. In general, it does not need to hold for SDFs derived from
distinct sets of assets, even if capital markets are completely integrated.
32Brennan and Xia, 2006 also use a continuous-time model.
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B Structural Models
We provide an example of a full-fledged model to illustrate how aggregate consumptions and
the real exchange rate are jointly determined in equilibrium. The model is a generalization
of Backus and Smith (1993) along three dimensions. First, we allow for preference differences
across countries. Second, we allow for incomplete markets. Third, like Backus and Smith
(1993) we have two goods, but we explicitly compare the case where the second good is
non-traded to the case in which it is frictionlessly traded. We don’t view this model as a
solution to existing exchange rate puzzles. Rather, it is merely illustrative of our point about
the joint determination of consumptions and the real exchange rate.
We describe an endowment economy with two countries (“U.S.” and “U.K.”) and repre-
sentative households within each country, Amy (American agent) and Bob (British agent).
Utility is defined over two goods, A and B. All goods are perishable and households live for
two periods (0 and 1). We suppress date subscripts unless strictly necessary.
Bob has the instantaneous utility function
U(cA, cB) = u[c(cA, cB)], (55)
where cA and cB denote, respectively, his consumption of goods A and B, c(·) is a homoge-
neous of degree one quasi-concave function of its arguments, and u is a monotonic function
with standard properties. Amy has the instantaneous utility function
U˜(c˜A, c˜B) = u[c˜(c˜A, c˜B)], (56)
where c˜A and c˜B denote, respectively, her consumption of goods A and B, and c˜(·) is a
homogeneous of degree one quasi-concave function of its arguments.
Both economies are cashless and use good A as the numeraire. Our model would have
the same implications for the real exchange rate if we chose different numeraires. Goods
markets meet sequentially. Good A is frictionlessly tradable. We alternately assume that
good B is frictionlessly tradable or non-tradable. Bob faces the price PB for good B. Amy
faces the price P˜B for good B. When good B is frictionlessly traded, its price must be the
same in both countries,
PB = P˜B. (57)
The natural definition of the consumer price index (CPI) in the U.S. (U.K.) is a variable
P˜ (P ) such that c˜A + P˜B c˜B = P˜ c˜(c˜A, c˜B) [cA + PBcB = P c(cA, cB)]. Since c(·) and c˜(·) are
homogeneous of degree one functions, it can be shown that there are homogeneous of degree
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one functions H(·) and H˜(·) whose form depends on c(·) and c˜(·), such that the U.K. and
U.S. CPIs are:
P = H(1, PB) and P˜ = H˜(1, P˜B) . (58)
To see that this is true consider Bob’s consumption aggregate, c(cA, cB). Given a particular
set of prices (in an arbitrary numeraire) for the individual goods, we can solve his static
expenditure minimization problem
min
cA,cB
PAcA + PBcB subject to c = c(cA, cB) . (59)
Because c(·) is a homogenous of degree one function, minimized expenditure is equal to Pc
where P = H(PA, PB). The function H(·) is also homogenous of degree one in its arguments,
and is related to the function c(·) [see Varian (1984)]. The aggregate price index has the
interpretation of being the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint at the optimum. To see
this, notice that the first order conditions (FOCs) for the expenditure minimization problem
are
PA = θccA(cA, cB) PB = θccB(cA, cB) . (60)
Multiplying these through these conditions by cA and cB and adding up you get PAcA +
PBcB = θc hence P = θ. We also have
H(PA, PB) = H[PccA(·), P ccB(·)] = PH[ccA(·), ccB(·)] ,
establishing that at the optimum, H[ccA(·), ccB(·)] = 1. The same argument applies to Amy.
With good A being the numeraire, we get Eq. (58).
The real exchange rate is given by Eq. (2); i.e. e ≡ P/P˜ . In the special case where
preferences are identical in the two countries, we have H(·) = H˜(·). If, additionally, both
goods are traded, e = 1, regardless of the asset market structure. If preferences differ across
countries and both goods are traded, variation in the real exchange rate can arise even
though P˜B = PB. All that is needed is variation in PB.
We use two versions of the model. The first version of the model assumes that asset
markets are incomplete and that the assets that are traded are common to both countries.
This allows us to derive general results on the relationship between the IMRSs of agents
in the two economies. Preferences are assumed to be time separable over the consumption
aggregate, but take an otherwise general form. The results we are interested in, with this
version of the model, extend to more general preference specifications.
The second version of the model is used to outline four specific examples where we can
derive the mapping from agents’ endowments to the equilibrium real exchange rate. Here
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we assume that agents have log utility over a Cobb-Douglas basket of the two goods. In
this version of the version of the model we assume that there exists a complete set of state-
contingent claims. We solve two extreme versions of the model. In one case, these assets
are traded in a single global market. In the second case, the two countries are in financial
autarky, so these assets can have different prices in the two locations. This is a different
example of incomplete markets.
B.1 Model 1
We assume that there are k assets with k× 1 random payoff vector Z(ω) in period 1, where
ω ∈ Ω represents the state of the world in period 1, which has probability pi(ω). We assume
that k is smaller than the number of states of the world, which is countable (for simplicity).
This means that, in general, asset markets are incomplete. The k × 1 price vector for these
assets in period 0 is PZ . The payoffs and prices of the assets are measured in units of good
A.
Bob chooses cA0, cB0, {cA1(ω), cB1(ω)}ω∈Ω, and a to maximize
u[c(cA0, cB0)] + β
∑
ω∈Ω
u{c[cA1(ω), cB1(ω)]}pi(ω) , (61)
subject to
cA0 + PB0cB0 + PZ · a = yA0 + PB0yB0 , (62)
cA1(ω) + PB1(ω)cB1(ω) = yA1(ω) + PB1(ω)yB1(ω) +Z(ω) · a , ω ∈ Ω. (63)
Here 0 < β < 1, cA1(ω) and cB1(ω) are Bob’s plans for future consumption (in every possible
state of the world), the jth element of a is Bob’s net purchases of asset j, and yA, yB are
Bob’s endowments of the two goods, which, in period 1, depend on the state of the world.
Similarly, Amy chooses c˜A0, c˜B0, {c˜A1(ω), c˜B1(ω)}ω∈Ω, and a˜ to maximize
u[c˜(c˜A0, c˜B0)] + β
∑
ω∈Ω
u{c˜[c˜A1(ω), c˜B1(ω)]}pi(ω) , (64)
subject to
c˜A0 + P˜B0c˜B0 + PZ · a˜ = y˜A0 + P˜B0y˜B0 . (65)
c˜A1(ω) + P˜B1(ω)c˜B1(ω) = y˜A1(ω) + P˜B1(ω)y˜B1(ω) +Z(ω) · a˜ , ω ∈ Ω. (66)
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The market clearing conditions for good A are
cA0 + c˜A0 = yA0 + y˜A0 , (67)
cA1(ω) + c˜A1(ω) = yA1(ω) + y˜A1(ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (68)
When good B is tradable we have the following market clearing conditions
cB0 + c˜B0 = yB0 + y˜B0 , (69)
cB1(ω) + c˜B1(ω) = yB1(ω) + y˜B1(ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (70)
When it is non-tradable, instead, we have
cB0 = yB0 , c˜B0 = y˜B0 , (71)
cB1(ω) = yB1(ω) , c˜B1(ω) = y˜B1(ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (72)
The market clearing condition in the asset market is
a+ a˜ = 0 . (73)
Definition. A competitive equilibrium is values of the quantities cA0, cB0, c˜A0, c˜B0, {cA1(ω), cB1(ω)}ω∈Ω,
{c˜A1(ω), c˜B1(ω)}ω∈Ω, a, a˜ and prices, PB0, P˜B0, {PB1(ω), P˜B1(ω)}ω∈Ω, PZ such that the
quantities solve Bob and Amy’s optimization problems (taking the prices as given), and
such that the market clearing conditions are satisfied. When good B is frictionlessly traded,
Eq. (57) must also be satisfied.
B.1.1 Risk Sharing and IMRSs. The two agents’ IMRSs, defined over units of their
respective consumption baskets are
M∗(ω) ≡ βuc[c1(ω)]/uc(c0) and M˜(ω) ≡ βuc˜[c˜1(ω)]/uc˜(c˜0) , (74)
where c0 and c˜0 are shorthand for c(cA0, cB0) and c˜(c˜A0, c˜B0), and c1(ω) and c˜1(ω) are short-
hand for c[cA1(ω), cB1(ω)] and c˜[c˜A1(ω), c˜B1(ω)].
We can also define the agents’ IMRSs over goods A and B:
MA(ω) ≡ βucA [c1(ω)]/ucA(c0) , M˜A(ω) ≡ βuc˜A [c˜1(ω)]/uc˜A(c˜0) , (75)
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MB(ω) ≡ βucB [c1(ω)]/ucB(c0) , M˜B(ω) ≡ βuc˜B [c˜1(ω)]/uc˜B(c˜0) . (76)
Definition. Perfect risk sharing describes any competitive equilibrium in which M˜A(ω) =
MA(ω) and M˜B(ω) = MB(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
B.1.2 Solving the Model. By nesting the expenditure minimization problem, described
above, within Bob’s problem, we can rewrite the latter as follows. Bob chooses c0, {c1(ω)}ω∈Ω
and a to maximize
u(c0) + β
∑
ω∈Ω
u [c1(ω)]pi(ω) (77)
subject to
P0c0 + PZ · a = yA0 + PB0yB0 , (78)
P1(ω)c1(ω) = yA1(ω) + PB1(ω)yB1(ω) +Z (ω) · a , ω ∈ Ω. (79)
The FOCs for c0, c1(ω), and a are
uc(c0) = P0λ , (80)
βuc[c1(ω)]pi(ω) = P1(ω)µ(ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (81)
PZλ =
∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)Z (ω) . (82)
Here λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (78), and µ(ω) is the Lagrange multiplier
on the constraint (79). So, combining (80) and (81), we get the following expression for
Bob’s IMRS, defined over his basket:
M∗(ω) =
βuc[c1(ω)]
uc(c0)
=
P1(ω)
P0
µ(ω)
λpi(ω)
. (83)
Amy chooses c˜0, {c˜1(ω)}ω∈Ω, and a˜ to maximize
u(c˜0) + β
∑
ω∈Ω
u [c˜1(ω)]pi(ω) (84)
subject to
P˜0c˜0 + PZ · a˜ = y˜A0 + P˜B0y˜B0 , (85)
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P˜1(ω)c˜1(ω) = y˜A1(ω) + P˜B1(ω)y˜B1(ω) +Z (ω) · a˜ , ω ∈ Ω. (86)
The FOCs for c˜0, {c˜1(ω)}ω∈Ω, and a˜ are
uc(c˜0) = P˜0λ˜ , (87)
βuc[c˜1(ω)]pi(ω) = P˜1(ω)µ˜(ω) , ω ∈ Ω, (88)
PZ λ˜ =
∑
ω∈Ω
µ˜(ω)Z (ω) . (89)
Here λ˜ is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (85), and µ˜(ω) is the Lagrange multiplier
on the constraint (86). So, combining (87) and (88), we get the following expression for
Amy’s IMRS, defined over her basket:
M˜(ω) =
βuc[c˜1(ω)]
uc(c˜0)
=
P˜1(ω)
P˜0
µ˜(ω)
λ˜pi(ω)
. (90)
Notice that M∗ is an SDF for payoffs and prices measured in Bob basket units. This is
because Eqs. (82) and (83) combined imply
PZ
P0
=
∑
ω∈Ω
M∗(ω)
Z(ω)
P1(ω)
pi(ω) . (91)
Similarly, M˜ is an SDF for payoffs and prices measured in Amy basket units. This is because
Eqs. (89) and (90) combined imply
PZ
P˜0
=
∑
ω∈Ω
M˜(ω)
Z(ω)
P˜1(ω)
pi(ω) . (92)
From (83) and (90), the ratio of M∗ to M˜ is
M∗(ω)
M˜(ω)
=
[
P1(ω)
P0
µ(ω)
λ
]
/
[
P˜1(ω)
P˜0
µ˜(ω)
λ˜
]
=
e1(ω)
e0
·
[
µ(ω)
λ
/
µ˜(ω)
λ˜
]
. (93)
Notice that since good A is the numeraire, the FOCs for cA0 and c˜A0, given in Eq. (60), along
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with Eqs. (80) and (87) imply that the time-0 marginal utilities of good A are
uc(c0)ccA(c0) = λ uc(c˜0)c˜cA(c˜0) = λ˜ . (94)
Similarly, when these FOCs are combined with Eqs. (81) and (88), we get expressions for the
time-1 discounted marginal utilities of good A:
βuc[c1(ω)]ccA [c1(ω)] = µ(ω)/pi(ω) , ω ∈ Ω, (95)
βuc[c˜1(ω)]c˜cA [c˜1(ω)] = µ˜(ω)/pi(ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (96)
Thus, MA(ω) = µ(ω)/[λpi(ω)] and M˜A(ω) = µ˜(ω)/[λ˜pi(ω)] are the IMRSs over good A.
Consequently, we can define
Ξ(ω) =
[
µ(ω)
λ
]
/
[
µ˜(ω)
λ˜
]
= MA(ω)/M˜A(ω).
Since we have X(ω) = e1(ω)/e0 we can rewrite Eq. (93) as
M∗(ω)
M˜(ω)
= X(ω) · Ξ(ω) , (97)
with Ξ(ω) being a measure of risk sharing in the frictionlessly traded good (good A). We can
also define M(ω) ≡ M∗(ω)/X(ω), which is Bob’s IMRS expressed indirectly using Amy’s
basket as the numeraire. Notice that this means
M(ω)
M˜(ω)
= Ξ(ω) . (98)
The FOCs for cB0 and c˜B0, given in Eq. (60), along with Eqs. (80) and (87) imply that
the time-0 marginal utilities of good B are
uc(c0)ccB(c0) = λPB0 uc(c˜0)c˜cB(c˜0) = λ˜P˜B0 . (99)
Similarly, when these FOCs are combined with Eqs. (81) and (88), we get expressions for the
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time-1 discounted marginal utilities of good B:
βuc[c1(ω)]ccB [c1(ω)] = µ(ω)PB1(ω)/pi(ω) , ω ∈ Ω, (100)
βuc[c˜1(ω)]c˜cB [c˜1(ω)] = µ˜(ω)P˜B1(ω)/pi(ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (101)
Thus, MB(ω) = MA(ω)PB1(ω)/PB0 and M˜B(ω) = M˜A(ω)P˜B1(ω)/P˜B0 are the IMRSs over
good B. Consequently, Ξ(ω)[P˜B1(ω)/P˜B0]/[PB1(ω)/PB0] is a measure of how well risk is
shared in good B. If good B is frictionlessly traded the price terms in this expression cancel
out and the measure of risk sharing in good B, as for good A, is Ξ(ω).
As we see in the next section, when the securities span variation in households’ marginal
utilities (i.e., if financial markets are complete) the FOCs for a and a˜ become equivalent to
ψ(ω)λ = µ(ω) , ψ(ω)λ˜ = µ˜(ω) , (102)
for all ω, where ψ(ω) is the price of a claim that pays one unit of good A in state ω. Notice
that when financial markets are complete, this implies MA(ω) = M˜A(ω) = ψ(ω)/pi(ω) and
Ξ(ω) = 1.
B.2 Model 2
In the second version of the model we make two changes. First, we assume that there is a
complete set of state contingent securities indexed by ω. Security ω pays one unit of good
A in state ω and zero otherwise. It’s price is ψ(ω) in the U.K. and ψ˜(ω) in the U.S. If
there is frictionless international trade in these assets (the complete markets case), we have
ψ(ω) = ψ˜(ω). Under financial autarky these prices can be different.
We adopt the assumptions that u(c) = ln c, c = cθAc
1−θ
B , and c˜ = c˜
θ˜
Ac
1−θ˜
B . These assump-
tions are useful because equilibrium prices and quantities can be worked out with pencil and
paper. They imply that the CPIs in the two countries, measured in units of good A, are
P = ρP 1−θB , and P˜ = ρ˜ P˜
1−θ˜
B , (103)
with ρ = θ−θ(1− θ)θ−1, and ρ˜ = θ˜−θ˜(1− θ˜)θ˜−1. The real exchange rate is
e = (ρ/ρ˜)(P 1−θB /P˜
1−θ˜
B ) . (104)
We discuss four specific examples of our model, which combine different assumptions
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about financial markets (complete markets vs. financial autarky) and goods market frictions
(good B is frictionlessly traded vs. good B is non-traded). By explicitly solving for the equi-
librium in these four cases, we demonstrate that real exchange rates and agents’ IMRSs are
jointly determined by the laws of motion of the endowments, together with our assumptions
about preferences, goods market frictions, and asset markets. We also illustrate that the
conditions under which risk sharing is imperfect, and those under which the real exchange
rate varies, are different.
With the different asset market setup, Bob’s budgets constraints are
cA0 + PB0cB0 +
∑
ω
ψ(ω)a(ω) = yA0 + PB0yB0 , (105)
cA1(ω) + PB1(ω)cB1(ω) = yA1(ω) + PB1(ω)yB1(ω) + a(ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (106)
while Amy’s are
c˜A0 + P˜B0c˜B0 +
∑
ω
ψ˜(ω)a˜(ω) = y˜A0 + P˜B0y˜B0 , (107)
c˜A1(ω) + P˜B1(ω)c˜B1(ω) = y˜A1(ω) + P˜B1(ω)y˜B1(ω) + a˜(ω) , ω ∈ Ω. (108)
We work out the full solutions in four special cases below. But, first, we summarize
the features of the competitive equilibria in each case. We use the following notation, and
henceforth drop the notational dependence of time 1 variables on ω unless it is needed.
The global endowment of good A in period t is YAt = yAt + y˜At. Analogously, for good B
we have YBt = yBt + y˜Bt. The growth rates of the global endowments are GA = YA1/YA0
and GB = YB1/YB0. We also define gA = yA1/yA0, gB = yB1/yB0, g˜A = y˜A1/y˜A0 and
g˜B = y˜B1/y˜B0. Bob’s time t share of the global endowment of good A is sAt = yAt/YAt.
Similarly, sBt = yBt/YBt. We let s¯A1 =
∑
ω sA1(ω)pi(ω) and s¯B1 =
∑
ω sB1(ω)pi(ω) denote
Bob average share of the global endowments in period 1.
B.2.1 Complete Markets, No Goods Market Frictions. When asset markets are
complete internationally and there are no goods market frictions (i.e., good B is frictionlessly
traded), then PBt = P˜Bt for all t and IMRSs in the individual goods are always equated across
countries. As we show in detail below, in good A the IMRS is β/GA. In good B the IMRS
is β/GB. Risk is shared perfectly, regardless of preferences.
In the case where preferences are identical, et = 1 for all t. When preferences differ across
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countries the expressions in Eq. (104) simplify to et = (ρ/ρ˜)P
θ˜−θ
Bt with PBt = κYAt/YBt and
κ =
(1− θ˜)(1 + β) + (θ˜ − θ)(sA0 + βs¯′A1)
θ˜(1 + β) + (θ − θ˜)(sB0 + βs¯′B1)
. (109)
Hence,
lnX = (θ˜ − θ) ln(PB1/PB0) = (θ˜ − θ) ln(GA/GB) . (110)
Real exchange rate fluctuations are driven by differences in the global growth rates of the
endowments of goods A and B. We see that if the global endowment of good A grows
faster than the global endowment of good B, then good B’s relative price rises. If Amy’s
preferences put more weight on good B than Bob’s preferences (i.e., θ˜ < θ), then her basket
becomes relatively more expensive (the U.S. real exchange rate appreciates).
B.2.2 Complete Markets, Good B is Non-traded. Now consider the case where
asset markets are complete internationally, but good B is non-traded. In this case, in general,
PB 6= P˜B. IMRSs in good A are always equated across countries: MA = M˜A = β/GA. IMRSs
in good B are, respectively, MB = β/gB and M˜B = β/g˜B, so risk is not shared perfectly
unless gB = g˜B in every state of the world in period 1.
When preferences differ across countries the real exchange rates are given by Eq. (104),
with prices given by
PBt = κ
YAt
yBt
, P˜Bt = κ˜
YAt
y˜Bt
, (111)
and
κ =
1− θ
(1 + β)θ
(sA0 + βs¯
′
A1) , κ˜ =
1− θ˜
(1 + β)θ˜
[1− sA0 + β(1− s¯′A1)] . (112)
This implies that
lnX = (1− θ˜) ln g˜B − (1− θ) ln gB + (θ˜ − θ) lnGA . (113)
Here, the real exchange rate depends on the relative growth rates of the endowment of good
B in the two countries, but the two growth rates matter to different extents due to preference
differences. Additionally, as was the case when good B was traded, if Amy’s preferences put
more weight on good B than Bob’s preferences (θ˜ < θ) then, other things being equal, the
U.S. real exchange rate appreciates when the global endowment of good A grows.
If preferences are identical, then the real exchange rate in Eq. (104) simplifies to et =
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(PBt/P˜Bt)
1−θ with prices still given by Eq. (111), but Eq. (112) becomes
κ =
1− θ
(1 + β)θ
(sA0 + βs¯
′
A1) , κ˜ =
1− θ
(1 + β)θ
[1− sA0 + β(1− s¯′A1)] . (114)
This means that
lnX = (1− θ) ln(g˜B/gB) . (115)
Here, the real exchange rate depends entirely on the relative growth rates of the endowment
of good B in the two countries. If the endowment grows more slowly in the U.S. (g˜B < gB),
its basket becomes relatively more expensive and its real exchange rate appreciates.
B.2.3 Financial Autarky, No Goods Market Frictions. The third case we consider
is where no assets are traded internationally, but goods markets are frictionless. In this case,
PBt = P˜Bt for all t. Risk sharing, in general, is imperfect. The ratio of IMRSs in the two
countries is the same in goods A and B. That is
MA
M˜A
=
MB
M˜B
= Ξ =
θ˜sA0 + (1− θ˜)sB0
θ(1− sA0) + (1− θ)(1− sB0) ×
θ(1− sA1) + (1− θ)(1− sB1)
θ˜sA1 + (1− θ˜)sB1
. (116)
This expression is the same when preferences are identical, except that θ = θ˜.
In the case where preferences are identical, e0 = e1 = 1. Risk sharing, on the other hand,
can be good or bad. Suppose, for example, that Bob’s shares of the global endowments vary
and comove positively. In this case, Ξ deviates from one a lot, implying that risk sharing
is limited. On the other hand, suppose that business cycles are strongly correlated across
countries, so that Bob’s shares of the global endowments do not change very much across
different states of the world next period. In this case, Ξ will be close to one in all states,
implying a high degree of risk sharing.
When preferences differ across countries then et = (ρ/ρ˜)P
θ˜−θ
Bt where PBt = κtYAt/YBt,
and
κt =
1− θ˜ + (θ˜ − θ)sAt
θ˜ + (θ − θ˜)sBt
. (117)
Hence,
lnX = (θ˜ − θ) [ln(GA/GB) + ln(κ1/κ0)] . (118)
As in the case of complete markets, real exchange rate fluctuations are driven by differences
in the growth rates of the two endowments. If the global endowment of good A grows
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faster than the global endowment of good B, then good B’s relative price rises. If Amy’s
preferences put more weight on good B than Bob’s preferences (θ˜ < θ) then Amy’s basket
becomes relatively more expensive (the U.S. real exchange rate appreciates). But the way
in which the agents’ shares of the global endowments fluctuate also matters for the real
exchange rate. In the example we just described, the U.S. real exchange rate rises more in
states of the world where κ1 > κ0. This could reflect, for example, a rise in Amy’s share of
the global endowment of good A (a drop of sAt) at the same time as the global endowment
of A rises relative to the global endowment of B.
B.2.4 Financial Autarky, Good B is Non-traded. The final case we consider com-
bines financial autarky with the assumption that good B is non-traded. In this case, each
agent simply consumes its own endowments. IMRSs in the individual goods are determined
by the country-specific endowment growth rates. For good A they are MA = β/gA and
M˜A = β/g˜A. In good B they are MB = β/gB and M˜B = β/g˜B. Risk is not shared unless
growth rates happen to coincide. The real exchange rates in the two periods are given by
Eq. (104), with
PBt =
(1− θ)
θ
yAt
yBt
, P˜Bt =
(1− θ˜)
θ˜
y˜At
y˜Bt
. (119)
Hence
lnX = (1− θ) ln(gA/gB)− (1− θ˜) ln(g˜A/g˜B). (120)
Suppose endowment growth rates are identical across goods; i.e., gA = gB and g˜A = g˜B.
Notice that this implies lnX = 0. There is no variation in the real exchange rate. The
extent of risk sharing, in contrast, depends only on whether gA = g˜A and gB = g˜B. It could
be good or bad. Suppose, on the other hand, that risk sharing is perfect; i.e., gA = g˜A and
gB = g˜B. We only get the result that lnX = 0 if θ = θ˜.
B.2.5 Discussion. Consider Table 1 from Section 4. It states that under complete mar-
kets, the observation that real exchange rates are variable only implies imperfect risk sharing
when the two agents have the same consumption basket. In our model, the agents have
identically-composed consumption baskets if and only if θ = θ˜, because θ and θ˜ are the
constant expenditure shares of good A in the two countries.
So suppose that θ = θ˜. Under complete markets, we saw that lnX = 0 and risk sharing
is perfect if trade in both goods is frictionless. On the other hand, lnX = (1− θ) ln(g˜B/gB)
and MB/M˜B = g˜B/gB if good B is non-traded. If one is willing to assume that markets
are complete, and that countries have identical preferences, risk sharing and exchange rate
changes are intimately linked in our model.
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Under incomplete markets, however, there is no link, in general, between risk sharing
and exchange rates, even when θ = θ˜. When θ = θ˜, and trade in both goods is frictionless,
lnX = 0 yet Ξ can depart arbitrarily from one, and therefore risk sharing can be arbitrarily
imperfect. When θ = θ˜, and good B is non-traded, lnX = 0 when risk sharing happens to
be perfect (i.e., when gA = g˜A and gB = g˜B in every possible state of the world next period),
but we also have lnX = 0 when risk sharing is “poor” and gA = gB 6= g˜A = g˜B.
More generally, our model illustrates that there is no direct link between the degree of
risk sharing and real exchange rate variability.
B.2.6 Solving Model 2 (Details). The FOCs for the individual consumption goods
and holdings of the securities are
θc−1A0 = λ, (121)
(1− θ)c−1B0 = PB0λ, (122)
βθcA1(ω)
−1pi(ω) = µ(ω), ω ∈ Ω, (123)
β(1− θ)cB1(ω)−1pi(ω) = PB1(ω)µ(ω), ω ∈ Ω, (124)
ψ(ω)λ = µ(ω), ω ∈ Ω. (125)
θ˜c˜−1A0 = λ˜, (126)
(1− θ˜)c˜−1B0 = P˜B0λ˜, (127)
βθ˜c˜A1(ω)
−1pi(ω) = µ˜(ω), ω ∈ Ω, (128)
β(1− θ˜)c˜B1(ω)−1pi(ω) = P˜B1(ω)µ˜(ω), ω ∈ Ω, (129)
ψ˜(ω)λ˜ = µ˜(ω), ω ∈ Ω. (130)
We can rewrite (121)–(124) and (126)–(129) using (125) and (130), as:
θ = λcA0 (131)
1− θ = λcB0PB0 (132)
βθ =
ψ(ω)λ
pi(ω)
cA1(ω) (133)
β(1− θ) = ψ(ω)λ
pi(ω)
cB1(ω)PB1(ω) (134)
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θ˜ = λ˜c˜A0 (135)
1− θ˜ = λ˜P˜B0c˜B0 (136)
βθ˜ =
ψ˜(ω)λ˜
pi(ω)
c˜A1(ω) (137)
β(1− θ˜) = ψ˜(ω)λ˜
pi(ω)
P˜B1(ω)c˜B1(ω) (138)
Here, we have dropped “ω ∈ Ω” from the equations for convenience.
In what follows we use the notation L = λ−1, L˜ = λ˜−1. Notice that L and L˜ are the
households’ total expenditures on goods in period zero.
When International Asset Markets are Complete Here we have ψ(ω) = ψ˜(ω), which
allows us to rewrite Eqs. (131)–(138) as
θL = cA0 (139)
(1− θ)L = cB0PB0 (140)
βθL =
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
cA1(ω) (141)
β(1− θ)L = ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
cB1(ω)PB1(ω) (142)
θ˜L˜ = c˜A0 (143)
(1− θ˜)L˜ = P˜B0c˜B0 (144)
βθ˜L˜ =
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
c˜A1(ω) (145)
β(1− θ˜)L˜ = ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
P˜B1(ω)c˜B1(ω) (146)
Bob’s lifetime budget constraint is
cA0 + PB0cB0 +
∑
ω
ψ(ω) [cA1(ω) + PB1(ω)cB1(ω)] =
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yA0 + PB0yB0 +
∑
ω
ψ(ω) [yA1(ω) + PB1(ω)yB1(ω)] (147)
From (139), (141), (143), and (145) we see that IMRSs in good A in the two countries
are equated:
MA(ω) = β
cA0
cA1(ω)
=
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
M˜A(ω) = β
c˜A0
c˜A1(ω)
=
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
(148)
From (140), (142), (144), and (146), IMRSs in good B are
MB(ω) = β
cB0
cB1(ω)
=
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
PB1(ω)
PB0
(149)
M˜B(ω) = β
c˜B0
c˜B1(ω)
=
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
P˜B1(ω)
P˜B0
(150)
When Good B is Traded The market clearing conditions for good A are
cA0 + c˜A0 = YA0 (151)
cA1(ω) + c˜A1(ω) = YA1(ω) (152)
cB0 + c˜B0 = YB0 (153)
cB1(ω) + c˜B1(ω) = YB1(ω) (154)
These conditions, together with (139)–(146), imply
θL+ θ˜L˜ = YA0 (155)
β(θL+ θ˜L˜) =
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
YA1(ω) (156)
(1− θ)L+ (1− θ˜)L˜ = PB0Y B0 (157)
β[(1− θ)L+ (1− θ˜)L˜] = ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
PB1(ω)YB1(ω) (158)
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Given a value of L we can solve the Eqs. (155) and (157) for L and PB0:
L˜ =
YA0
θ˜
− θ
θ˜
L (159)
PB0 =
θ˜−θ
θ˜
L+ (1−θ˜
θ˜
)YA0
YB0
(160)
Combining Eqs. (155) and (156) we get
MA(ω) = βGA(ω)
−1 =
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
(161)
Combining Eqs. (157) and (158) and previous results we get
PB1(ω)/PB0 = GA(ω)/GB(ω) (162)
The IMRS in good B is
MB(ω) = MA(ω)PB1(ω)/PB0 = βGB(ω)
−1 (163)
IMRSs are equated across countries in both goods (but not across goods) are equated:
MA(ω) = M˜A(ω) and MB(ω) = M˜B(ω). This is true regardless of preferences.
Identical Preferences
If preferences are identical we have θ = θ˜ so that Eq. (160) becomes
PB0 =
1− θ
θ
YA0
YB0
(164)
and Eq. (162) implies
PB1(ω) =
1− θ
θ
YA1(ω)
YB1(ω)
(165)
Since trade is frictionless and preferences are identical e0 = e1(ω) = 1.
We can solve for allocations by solving for L. To do this we consider the lifetime budget
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constraint, (147), and use the results (and notation) so far to write it as
(1 + β)L =
[
sA0 + βs¯A1 + (
1− θ
θ
)(sB0 + βs¯B1)
]
YA0 (166)
This implies
L =
θ(sA0 + βs¯A1) + (1− θ) (sB0 + βs¯B0)
θ(1 + β)
YA0 (167)
Eq. (159) then implies that
L˜ =
θ[(1− sA0) + β(1− s¯A1)] + (1− θ)[(1− sB0) + β(1− s¯B1)]
θ(1 + β)
YA0 (168)
Different Preferences
With different preferences we need to solve for L. To do this we consider the lifetime
budget constraint, (147), and use the results (and notation) so far to write it as
(1 + β)L =
[
sA0 + βs¯A1 + (
1− θ˜
θ˜
)(sB0 + βs¯B1)
]
YA0 +
θ˜ − θ
θ˜
(sB0 + βs¯B1)L (169)
This implies
L =
θ˜(sA0 + βs¯A1) + (1− θ˜) (sB0 + βs¯B1)
θ˜(1 + β) + (θ − θ˜) (sB0 + βs¯B1)
YA0 (170)
Eq. (159) then implies that
L˜ =
θ[(1− sA0) + β(1− s¯A1)] + (1− θ)[(1− sB0) + β(1− s¯B1)]
θ˜(1 + β) + (θ − θ˜) (sB0 + βs¯B1)
YA0 (171)
and (160) implies that
PB0 =
(1− θ˜) (1 + β) +
(
θ˜ − θ
)
(sA0 + βs¯A1)
θ˜ (1 + β) +
(
θ − θ˜
)
(sB0 + βs¯B1)
YA0
YB0
, (172)
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Given Eq. (162) we have
PB1(ω) =
GA(ω)
GB(ω)
PB0 =
(1− θ˜) (1 + β) +
(
θ˜ − θ
)
(sA0 + βs¯A1)
θ˜ (1 + β) +
(
θ − θ˜
)
(sB0 + βs¯B1)
YA1(ω)
YB1(ω)
. (173)
Since good B is traded, P˜B0 = PB0 and P˜B1(ω) = PB1(ω) so
e0 = (ρ/ρ˜)P
θ˜−θ
B0 e1(ω) = (ρ/ρ˜)PB1(ω)
θ˜−θ
But this means
ln [e1(ω)/e0] = (θ˜ − θ) ln [PB1(ω)/PB0] = (θ˜ − θ) ln [GA(ω)/GB(ω)]
When Good B is Non-traded The market clearing conditions for good A are (151)
and (152). For good B they are
cB0 = yB0 , c˜B0 = y˜B0 (174)
cB1(ω) = yB1(ω) , c˜B1(ω) = y˜B1(ω) (175)
The market clearing conditions and the FOCs together imply that Eqs. (155) and (156) hold
along with
(1− θ)L = PB0yB0 (1− θ˜)L˜ = P˜B0y˜B0 (176)
β(1− θ)L = ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
PB1(ω)yB1(ω) β(1− θ˜)L˜ = ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
P˜B1(ω)y˜B1(ω) (177)
Given the results so far, the lifetime budget constraint of the home household, (147),
becomes:
(1 + β)θL = κYA0,
where κ = sA0 + βs¯A1, and implies
L =
κ
θ(1 + β)
YA0. (178)
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If we combine Eqs. (155) and (178) we have
L˜ =
κ˜
θ˜(1 + β)
YA0 (179)
where κ˜ = 1− sA0 + β(1− s¯A1).
Combining Eqs. (155) and (156) we have
MA(ω) = βGA(ω)
−1 =
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
(180)
Combining Eqs. (176), (178) and (179) we have
PB0 =
(1− θ)κ
θ(1 + β)
YA0
yB0
P˜B0 =
(1− θ˜)κ˜
θ˜(1 + β)
YA0
y˜B0
. (181)
If we combine (176) and (177), and make use of (180) we get
PB1(ω)
PB0
=
GA(ω)
gB(ω)
P˜B1(ω)
P˜B0
=
GA(ω)
g˜B(ω)
. (182)
Therefore, we can write
PB1(ω) =
(1− θ)κ
θ(1 + β)
YA1(ω)
yB1(ω)
P˜B1(ω) =
(1− θ˜)κ˜
θ˜(1 + β)
YA1(ω)
y˜B1(ω)
. (183)
The IMRSs in good B are
MB(ω) =
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
PB1(ω)
PB0
=
β
gB(ω)
M˜B(ω) =
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
P˜B1(ω)
P˜B0
=
β
g˜B(ω)
. (184)
Identical Preferences
We have
e0 =
(
PB0/P˜B0
)1−θ
=
(
κ
κ˜
y˜B0
yB0
)1−θ
.
e1(ω) =
(
PB1(ω)/P˜B1(ω)
)1−θ
=
[
κ
κ˜
y˜B1(ω)
yB1(ω)
]1−θ
.
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And this means
ln[e1(ω)/e0] = (1− θ) ln [g˜B(ω)/gB(ω)]
Different Preferences
e0 = (
ρ
ρ˜
)
P 1−θB0
P˜ 1−θ˜B0
= (
ρ
ρ˜
)
[
(1−θ)
(1+β)θ
κYA0
yB0
]1−θ
[
(1−θ˜)
(1+β)θ˜
κ˜YA0
y˜B0
]1−θ˜ = ( θ˜θ )
(
κy−1B0
)1−θ(
κ˜y˜−1B0
)1−θ˜
(
YA0
1 + β
)θ˜−θ
.
e1(ω) = (
ρ
ρ˜
)
PB1(ω)
1−θ
P˜B1(ω)1−θ˜
= (
θ˜
θ
)
[κyB1(ω)
−1]1−θ
[κ˜y˜B1(ω)−1]
1−θ˜
[
YA1(ω)
1 + β
]θ˜−θ
So
ln[e1(ω)/e0] = (1− θ˜) ln g˜B(ω)− (1− θ) ln gB(ω) + (θ˜ − θ) lnGA(ω).
Financial Autarky Since the countries are in financial autarky, we no longer have ψ(ω) =
ψ˜(ω), so the rearranged FOCs for consumption are
θL = cA0 (185)
(1− θ)L = cB0PB0 (186)
βθL =
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
cA1(ω) (187)
β(1− θ)L = ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
cB1(ω)PB1(ω) (188)
θ˜L˜ = c˜A0 (189)
(1− θ˜)L˜ = P˜B0c˜B0 (190)
βθ˜L˜ =
ψ˜(ω)
pi(ω)
c˜A1(ω) (191)
β(1− θ˜)L˜ = ψ˜(ω)
pi(ω)
P˜B1(ω)c˜B1(ω) (192)
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Bob’s flow budget constraints must be satisfied with no asset holdings so we have
cA0 + PB0cB0 = yA0 + PB0yB0 (193)
cA1(ω) + PB1(ω)cB1(ω) = yA1(ω) + PB1(ω)yB1(ω). (194)
The expressions for the IMRSs in goods A and B:
MA(ω) = β
cA0
cA1(ω)
=
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
M˜A(ω) = β
c˜A0
c˜A1(ω)
=
ψ˜(ω)
pi(ω)
(195)
MB(ω) = β
cB0
cB1(ω)
=
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
PB1(ω)
PB0
M˜B(ω) = β
c˜B0
c˜B1(ω)
=
ψ˜(ω)
pi(ω)
P˜B1(ω)
P˜B0
(196)
When Good B is Traded The market clearing conditions for goods are Eqs. (151)–
(154), which, together with the FOCs, imply
θL+ θ˜L˜ = YA0 (197)
θ
ψ(ω)
L+
θ˜
ψ˜(ω)
L˜ =
1
βpi(ω)
YA1(ω) (198)
(1− θ)L+ (1− θ˜)L˜ = PB0YB0 (199)
(1− θ) L
ψ(ω)
+ (1− θ˜) L˜
ψ˜(ω)
=
1
βpi(ω)
PB1(ω)YB1(ω) . (200)
We can rearrange Eqs. (197) and (199) to get:
L˜ =
1
θ˜
(YA0 − θL) (201)
PB0 =
1
θ˜
(θ˜ − θ)L+ (1− θ˜)YA0
YB0
, (202)
We can rearrange Eqs. (198) and (200) to get:
βpi(ω)
ψ˜(ω)
L˜ =
1
θ˜
[
YA1(ω)− θβpi(ω)
ψ(ω)
L
]
. (203)
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PB1(ω) =
1
θ˜
(θ˜ − θ)βpi(ω)
ψ(ω)
L+ (1− θ˜)YA1(ω)
YB1(ω)
(204)
Eqs. (193) and (202) imply that
L = yA0 +
θ˜−θ
θ˜
L+ (1− θ˜)YA0
θ˜
YB0
yB0
or
L =
θ˜sA0 + (1− θ˜)sB0
θ˜ + (θ − θ˜)sB0
YA0 (205)
Eqs. (194) and (204) imply that
βpi(ω)
ψ(ω)
L =
θ˜sA1(ω) + (1− θ˜)sB1(ω)
θ˜ + (θ − θ˜)sB1(ω)
YA1(ω). (206)
Using (205) we then have Bob’s IMRS in good A:
MA(ω) =
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
= β
ξA(ω)
GA(ω)
with ξA(ω) =
θ˜sA0+(1−θ˜)sB0
θ˜+(θ−θ˜)sB0
θ˜sA1(ω)+(1−θ˜)sB1(ω)
θ˜+(θ−θ˜)sB1(ω)
(207)
Substituting (205) into (201) we get
L˜ =
θ(1− sA0) + (1− θ) (1− sB0)
θ + (θ˜ − θ)(1− sB0)
YA0. (208)
Substituting (206) into (203) we get
βpi(ω)
ψ˜(ω)
L˜ =
θ[1− sA1(ω)] + (1− θ)[1− sB1(ω)]
θ + (θ˜ − θ)[1− sB1(ω)]
YA1(ω). (209)
Given these results, Amy’s IMRS in good A is
M˜A(ω) =
ψ˜(ω)
pi(ω)
= β
ξ˜A(ω)
GA(ω)
, ξ˜A(ω) =
θ(1−sA0)+(1−θ)(1−sB0)
θ+(θ˜−θ)(1−sB0)
θ[1−sA1(ω)]+(1−θ)[1−sB1(ω)]
θ+(θ˜−θ)[1−sB1(ω)]
. (210)
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Substituting (205) into (202)
PB0 =
1− θ˜ + (θ˜ − θ)sA0
θ˜ + (θ − θ˜)sB0
YA0
YB0
(211)
Substituting (206) into (204)
PB1(ω) =
[
1− θ˜ + (θ˜ − θ)sA1(ω)
θ˜ + (θ − θ˜)sB1(ω)
]
YA1(ω)
YB1(ω)
(212)
IMRSs in good B are
MB(ω) = β
ξA(ω)
GA(ω)
PB1(ω)
PB0
= β
ξA(ω)
GB(ω)
ξB(ω), (213)
M˜B(ω) = β
ξ˜A(ω)
GA(ω)
PB1(ω)
PB0
= β
ξ˜A(ω)
GB(ω)
ξB(ω) (214)
with
ξB(ω) =
[
1− θ˜ + (θ˜ − θ)sA1(ω)
θ˜ + (θ − θ˜)sB1(ω)
]
/
[
1− θ˜ + (θ˜ − θ)sA0
θ˜ + (θ − θ˜)sB0
]
. (215)
Identical Preferences
If preferences are identical Eqs. (211) and (212) simplify to
PB0 =
1− θ
θ
YA0
YB0
(216)
PB1(ω) =
1− θ
θ
YA1(ω)
YB1(ω)
(217)
Since both goods are frictionlessly traded and preferences are identical e0 = e1(ω) = 1.
The expressions for ξA and ξ˜A in Eqs. (207) and (210) simplify to
ξA(ω) =
θsA0 + (1− θ)sB0
θsA1(ω) + (1− θ)sB1(ω) (218)
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ξ˜A(ω) =
θ(1− sA0) + (1− θ) (1− sB0)
θ[1− sA1(ω)] + (1− θ)[1− sB1(ω)] (219)
The expression for ξB in Eq. (213) simplifies to ξB(ω) = 1, implying that
MB(ω) = β
ξA(ω)
GB(ω)
M˜B(ω) = β
ξ˜A(ω)
GB(ω)
(220)
The wedge between IMRSs in goods A and B, and in terms of aggregate consumption, is
M˜A(ω)/MA(ω) = M˜B(ω)/MB(ω) = M˜(ω)/M(ω) = ξ˜A(ω)/ξA(ω).
Different Preferences
Given the expressions for prices, above,
e0 = (ρ/ρ˜)P
θ˜−θ
B0 = (ρ/ρ˜)
1− θ˜ +
(
θ˜ − θ
)
sA0
θ˜ +
(
θ − θ˜
)
sB0
YA0
YB0
θ˜−θ
and
e1(ω) = (ρ/ρ˜)PB1(ω)
θ˜−θ = (ρ/ρ˜)
(
1− θ˜ + (θ˜ − θ)sA1(ω)
θ˜ + (θ − θ˜)sB1(ω)
YA1(ω)
YB1(ω)
)θ˜−θ
When Good B is Non-traded Because good B is non-traded the market clearing
conditions and Bob’s budget constraints together imply
cA0 = yA0 , c˜A0 = y˜A0 (221)
cA1(ω) = yA1(ω) , c˜A1(ω) = y˜A1(ω) (222)
cB0 = yB0 , c˜B0 = y˜B0 , (223)
cB1(ω) = yB1(ω) , c˜B1(ω) = y˜B1(ω) . (224)
So
L = yA0/θ (225)
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PB0 =
1− θ
θ
yA0
yB0
(226)
ψ(ω)
pi(ω)
= β/gA(ω) (227)
PB1(ω) =
1− θ
θ
yA1(ω)
yB1(ω)
(228)
L˜ = y˜A0/θ˜ (229)
P˜B0 =
1− θ˜
θ˜
y˜A0
y˜B0
, (230)
ψ˜(ω)
pi(ω)
= β/g˜A(ω) (231)
P˜B1(ω) =
1− θ˜
θ˜
y˜A1(ω)
y˜B1(ω)
(232)
IMRSs in goods A and B are
MA(ω) = β/gA(ω) M˜A(ω) = β/g˜A(ω)
MB(ω) = β/gB(ω) M˜B(ω) = β/g˜B(ω)
If preferences are identical we have
e0 =
(
yA0/yB0
y˜A0/y˜B0
)1−θ
=
(
(1− sB0)/sB0
(1− sA0)/sA0
)1−θ
.
e1(ω) =
(
yA1(ω)/yB1(ω)
y˜A1(ω)/y˜B1(ω)
)1−θ
=
(
[1− sB1(ω)] /sB1(ω)
[1− sA1(ω)] /sA1(ω)
)1−θ
.
otherwise
e0 = (ρ/ρ˜)[
1− θ
θ
yA0
yB0
]1−θ/[
1− θ˜
θ˜
y˜A0
y˜B0
]1−θ˜.
e1(ω) = (ρ/ρ˜)[
1− θ
θ
yA1(ω)
yB1(ω)
]1−θ/[
1− θ˜
θ˜
y˜A1(ω)
y˜B1(ω)
]1−θ˜.
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